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THINK PINK! COLOR CAN BE A TRADEMARK
The Lanham Act' governs the registration 2 and protection of trademarks
4
used in interstate commerce.' To qualify as a trademark, the owner of the
I. Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982)).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1096 (1982) (provisions governing trademark registration on
Principle and Supplemental Registers). Under the Lanham Act, the owner of a trademark
cannot obtain federal registration of the mark until the owner has used the mark in commerce.
Id. § 1051. The term "commerce" under the Lanham Act means all commerce that Congress
may regulate. Id. § 1127; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Congress has power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, among states, and with Indian tribes). The Lanham Act provides for the
federal registration of a mark on either the Principle Register or the Supplemental Register. See
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (satisfaction of enumerated prerequisites permits owner of trademark used in
commerce to register on Principle Register); id. § 1091 (trademarks used in commerce and not
registrable on Principle Register are registrable on Supplemental Register). Any trademark that
distinguishes the goods or services of the registration applicant from the goods or services of
others is registrable on the Principle Register unless the mark falls within certain exceptions
provided in § 1052 of the Lanham Act. Id. § 1052(a)-(e). Subsection (a) of § 1052 bars the
registration upon the Principle Register of immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter. Id. §
1052(a). Subsection (b) prohibits the registration of a mark that consists of an insignia or
simulation of an insignia of the United States, a state, a municipality, or a foreign nation. Id.
§ 1052(b). Subsection (c) bars the registration of names, portraits, or signatures of living persons
without the written consent of those persons. Id. § 1052(c). Subsection (c) also prohibits the
registration of the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased United States president during the
widow's life except by written permission of the widow. Id. Subsection (d) bars the registration
of any mark so similar to a currently registered trademark that, if applied to the applicant's
goods, the mark likely would cause confusion, mistake, or deception in the marketplace. Id. §
1052(d). subsection (e) prohibits the registration of a mark that is merely descriptive or
deceptively descriptive of the owner's goods or of a geographical location. Id. § 1052(e).
Additionally, subsection (e) bars the registration of a surname as a trademark. Id. Section
1052(0 of the Lanham Act provides that any mark not excluded under subsections (a)-(d) is
registrable if the mark has "become distinctive" of the applicant's goods in commerce. Id. §
1052(0. A mark has "become distinctive" or gained "secondary meaning" if consumers
associate the mark exclusively with the product owner. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying
text (defining acquired distinctiveness, otherwise known as secondary meaning); see also infra
notes 124-37, 215-36 and accompanying text (discussing § 1052(0 as basis of secondary meaning
test). Proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use of a mark in commerce by the
applicant for the five years prior to application is prima facie evidence of acquired distinctiveness
under subsection (f). 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0.
Although several conditions may prohibit registration on the Principal Register, the
registration requirements for the Supplemental Register are less stringent. See id. § 1091. Marks
that are not registrable on the Principle Register and do not fall within the § 1052(a)-(d)
exceptions are registrable on the Supplemental Register. Id. Under § 1091 of the Lanham Act,
the marks must be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services. Id. In addition,
the owner of the mark exclusively must have used the mark in connection with the owner's
goods in commerce for the year prior to application. Id. Furthermore, if the applicant shows
that the applicant requires domestic registration as a basis for foreign trademark protection,
the one year use requirement may not be a prerequisite for registration. Id.
Registration on the Principal Register rather than on the Supplemental Register, however,
creates several substantive and procedural advantages for the registrant. See id. §§ 1065, 1072,
1115(a), 1124. For example, a Principal Register registration, unlike a Supplemental Register
registration, generally is incontestable if the owner continuously uses the trademark for five
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consecutive years after registration. See id. § 1065 (conditions under which trademark incon-
testable). In addition, unlike registration on the Supplemental Register, registration on the
Principal Register gives nationwide constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership.
Id. § 1072. Registration on the Principal Register also constitutes prima facie evidence of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce on the goods specified in the registration,
whereas registration on the Supplemental Register does not constitute such prima facie evidence.
Id. § 1115(a). Furthermore, the Principal Register registrant, unlike the Supplemental Register
registrant, may record a registered trademark with the United States Treasury Department to
block the importation of goods bearing an infringing mark. See id. § 1124 (forbidding
importation of goods bearing infringing marks). See generally J. GILSON, 1 TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND PRACTICES §§ 4.02-4.05 (1985) (discussing substantive and procedural advan-
tages of Principal Register registration).
While Principal Register registration is preferable to Supplemental Register registration,
Supplemental Register registration is preferable to no federal trademark registration. See M.
BERAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADEMARK PRACTICE 144-45 (1970). Registration of a mark on
the Supplemental Register gives the registrant the right to bring suit in a federal court without
a showing of diversity of citizenship. Id. at 144. Supplemental Register registration also provides
the basis for trademark registration in foreign countries in which the trademark owner has not
used the mark. Id. In addition, registration on the Supplemental Register deters innocent
infringement since persons seeking to select a trademark will search the trademark records of
the United States Patent Office to determine the availability of the proposed mark. Id. at 145.
The process for registration on the Principal and Supplemen tal Registers begins with the
trademark owner's filing of a signed, written application with the Patent and Trademark Office.
See U.S.C. § 1051 (discussing application process for obtaining federal registrations of trade-
mark). The application should specify the applicant's domicile, citizenship, the date of the
applicant's first use of the mark, and the date of the applicant's first use of the mark in
commerce. Id. § 1051(a)(1). The application also should describe the manner in which the
applicant uses the mark in connection with specified goods or services. Id. Furthermore, the
applicant must verify in writing on the application that the applicant is the rightful exclusive
owner of the mark that the applicant seeks to register. Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 2.31-2.47 (1985)
(discussing requirement of written application in trademark registration). In addition to filing
the written application, the registration applicant must submit a drawing of the mark and actual
specimens or copies of the mark as used in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2)-(3); 37 C.F.R. §
2.51-2.58 (1985) (discussing drawing and specimen requirements in trademark registration
application). The applicant also must pay the Patent and Trademark Office a filing fee. 15
U.S.C. §1051(b). As of 1985, the filing fee was $175 for each classification of goods for which
the applicant sought registration. 37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a) (1985).
Upon the applicant's filing of an application and payment of the filing fee, the
Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office (Commissioner) transfers the application to
an Examiner, who determines the registrability of the mark. 15 U.S.C. §1062; see supra
(discussing requirements of registering on either the Principle or Supplemental Registers). The
Examiner inspects the application for correctness in form and content and searches the records
of the Patent and Trademark Office for prior registration of the mark by another market
competitor. D. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK TACTICS AND PRACTICE 136-37 (2d ed. 1984).
If the Examiner finds the applicant's mark unregistrable, the applicant may reply or amend the
application within 6 months. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(b); see 37 C.F.R. § 6(g) (1985) (filing fee for
amendment to trademark registration application is $100). The applicant may repeat the
amendment process until the Examiner makes a final ruling. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(b). The applicant
may appeal any final decision of the Examiner to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB). Id. § 1067. The TTAB includes the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant
Commissioners, and other members appointed by the Commissioner. Id. If the Examiner finds
the applicant's mark entitled to registration, the Commissioner will publish the mark in the
Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office after notifying the applicant. Id. § 1062(a).
Any person who believes that the registration would damage him or her may file an opposition
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mark must use the mark to identify the owner's product and to distin-
in the Patent and Trademark Office within 30 days after the publication. Id. § 1063. If anyone
opposes the trademark registration, the Commissioner will notify all parties and refer the case
to the TTAB for a determination of the applicant's right to registration. Id. § 1067.
The registration applicant or party to an opposition proceeding who is dissatisfied with
the TTAB's decision may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
within 60 days after the TTAB ruling. Id. § 1071(a)(l)-(2). The Commissioner must send to the
Federal Circuit copies of all necessary papers and evidence specified by the parties. Id. §
1071(a)(3). In the case of an appeal by a registration applicant involving the Patent and
Trademark Office (Office) as a litigant, the Commissioner additionally must furnish the circuit
court with a brief, setting out the grounds of the Office's decision not to register the mark and
the issues on appeal. Id. The Federal Circuit will not reverse a TTAB ruling unless the TTAB
clearly erred in determining a question of fact or abused the TTAB's discretion in determining
a question of law. J. GILSON, supra, § 3.05[4][a][ii].
As an alternative to appeal to the Federal circuit, the dissatisfied applicant or the party
opposing registration may seek standard civil redress before any district court not less than 60
days after the TTAB ruling. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1). Unlike the Federal Circuit review, the
district court proceeding is similar to a trial de novo in that the parties may present additional
evidence not included in the TTAB record. Id. § 1071(b)(3)-(4); J. GItSON, supra, § 3.05[4][b].
If the parties do not present new evidence, however, the district court will employ the standard
of review used in the Federal Circuit appeal process, reversing only for clear error or abuse of
discretion. J. GiLsoN, supra, § 3.05[4][b][ii]. Even if the parties present new evidence, the
district court must accord the TTAB findings considerable weight. Id.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982) (providing remedy for infringement); id. § 1116 (empow-
ering courts to grant injunctions to protect registrant's rights); id. § 1117 (providing registrant
recovery of illegal profits, damages, and court costs in infringement suit); id. § 1118 (providing
for destruction of infringing articles); id. § 1124 (forbidding importation of goods bearing
infringing marks); id. § 1125 (establishing liability for use of false origin designations or false
descriptions in connection with goods in commerce). Under the infringement provisions of the
Lanham Act, a person is civilly liable if, without the registrant's consent, the person uses a
copy of a registered mark in commerce in a manner that is likely to deceive or to cause mistake
or confusion in the market. Id. § 11 14(l)(a). A person also is liable for damages if the person
deceptively or confusingly applies an imitation of a registered mark on goods the person intends
to use in commerce. Id. § 1114(1)(b); see id. § 1114(2) (limiting remedies to owner of infringed
right). No clear guide exists by which courts may determine the likelihood of consumer confusion
in distinguishing among similarly marked goods. J. GItSON, supra note 2, § 5.01.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit however has considered several
conditions in determining the likelihood of confusion. See Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v.
Logue, 746 F.2d 1033, 1040 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit has looked at the nature of the
marks involved, the similarity of the parties' marks, and the similarity of the marked goods.
Id. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has considered the identity of retail outlets, purchasers, and
advertising media. Id. Finally, the Fifth Circuit has examined the intent of the alleged infringer
and the actual confusion generated in the market. Id.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). The United States Code defines trademark as any word,
name, symbol, device, or any combination of such marks. Id.
5. See id. §§ 1127 (federal trademark protection extends only to trademarks used in
interstate commerce); see also Trademark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724 (authorizing registration
and protection of trademarks used in foreign and interstate commerce). See generally J. GILsON,
supra note 2, § 1.04[1] (discussing Lanham Act replacement of Trademark Act of 1905 as
federal trademark statute). Unlike the Lanham Act, the Trademark Act of 1905 required that
the registration applicant exclusively use a mark for 10 years in commerce to show that the
mark had acquired distinctiveness. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1982) (five year presumption
of acquired distinctiveness) with 33 Stat. 724 (1905) (10 year presumption of distinctiveness).
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guish the owner's goods from the goods of competitors. 6 An important issue
arising in trademark litigation is whether the Lanham Act extends federal
trademark protection to the color of a product.7 . Whether federal trademark
law protects the use of color is important because color attracts the consum-
er's attention to products and, therefore, is an effective marketing tool. 8 The
United States Supreme Court never has denied expressly the possibility that
federal trademark law might protect color.9 Since the passage of the Lanham
Otherwise, the Lanham Act substantially parallels the Trademark Act of 1905. S. Rep. No.
1333, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1274, 1275
[HEREINAFTER CITED AS 1946 Senate Report]. Before the passage of the Lanham Act, federal
trademark statutes were widely scattered 1946 Senate Report, supra, at 1276; see, e.g.,
52 Stat. 638 (1938) (authorizing registration of certain trademarks used to indicate membership
in organization); 46 Stat. 590, 741 (1930) (Tariff Act of 1930 prohibiting importation of goods
bearing infringing mark); 33 Stat. 724 (1905) (Trademark Act of 1905). Congress found that
policies concerning trademark protection had changed since 1905 and that subsequent federal
statutes had failed to keep pace with commercial practices. 1946 Senate Report, supra, at 1276.
The Lanham Act repealed only those portions of former acts that were inconsistent with the
Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. Congress in effect incorporated and refined the various
trademark statutes in enacting the Lanham Act. 1946 Senate Report, supra, at 1276.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982); see Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks,
73 TRADE-MARK REP. 222,246-47 (1983) (discussing trademark functions). One commentator
has described three functions of the modern trademark. Article, supra, at 246-47. First, through
the trademark's identifying function, the consumer may distinguish among similar products. Id.
at 246. Without such identification, the buyer could not make a knowledgeable choice among
goods of varying quality. Id.; see J. GnsoN, supra note 2, § 1.03 (trademark's identification of
product and product source protects buyer from confusion and deception). Second, through
the guarantee function, the trademark assures the buyer of consistent quality among goods
bearing the trademark. Article, supra, at 246; see J. GItsoN, supra note 2, § 1.03 (trademark
denotes standard of quality and symbolizes good will of owner). Finally, the trademark serves
as an advertising function, attracting the attention of potential purchasers. Article, supra, at
247; see Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge, 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)
(trademark induces buyer to purchase goods bearing that trademark).
7. See infra notes 9-260 and accompanying text (discussing cases addressing issue of
color protection).
8. See Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trademark
Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 345, 346 n.5 (1983) (color's
aesthetic appeal is important to marketing potential of product); Lehrer, Pink is Taken; But a
Few Hues Are Still Left, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1986, at 33, col. 3 (color is important marketing
tool because color "grabs" consumer's attention); see also Diamond, supra note 6, at 247
(trademark advertising function important when products bought off shelf); infra notes 9, 196-
97 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of aesthetic functionality).
9. See A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166,
170-72 (1906). In A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., the United
States Supreme Court denied infringement protection of the plaintiff's trademark. Id. at 170.
The plaintiff's trademark consisted of an unspecified distinctively colored streak woven in a
wire rope. Id. The Supreme court found the mark too indefinite to constitute a valid trademark.
Id. The Supreme court, therefore, held that the defendant had not infringed upon the plaintiff's
trademark rights when the defendant produced a similarly colored wire rope. Id. at 172. The
Supreme Court further stated that protection of the plaintiff's trademark was doubtful even if
the plaintiff had restricted the mark to a particular color applied in a particular manner. Id. at
171-72. The Court stated that though color impressed in a particular design could constitute a
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Act in 1946, however, the majority of federal circuit courts have denied
trademark protection of product color unless the product owner uses the
color in conjunction with words, designs, or other distinguishing matter.'0
In the recent case of In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the
Federal Circuit should construe the Lanham Act, post-Lanham Act case law,
valid trademark, no court had ruled on the validity of color alone as trademark. Id. at 171.
subsequently, in dictum, the Supreme Court referred to an English case in which the Chancery
Division denied color protection to avoid potential monopoly of all the colors of the rainbow
and, thus, to encourage free competition in commerce. Id. at 172. Nowhere in the A. Leschen
& Sons Rope Co. decision, however, did the Supreme court expressly deny the possibility that
color alone might gain trademark protection. See id. at 170-72 (containing no language expressly
prohibiting federal trademark protection of color alone).
In the more recent case of Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., the
Supreme Court suggested that product color may serve non-trademark functions, in which case
color would not enjoy federal trademark protection. See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853, 858-59 (1982) (Supreme Court suggested that functionality
of capsule coloring might bar trademark protection of coloring); see also Ives Laboratories,
Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 398-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying trademark
protection to capsules under functionality doctrine in part because patients associated capsule
colorings with therapeutic affect). Under the functionality doctrine, courts generally deny
protection of functional marks. See infra notes 45-50, 105-07, 189-92 and accompanying text
(discussing cases in which court applied functionality doctrine). Functional marks are those
product features that are essential to the use of a product or that merely affect the purpose,
performance, or efficiency of a product. Note, supra note 8, at 359-61; see RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 742 (1938) (defining "functional" product features); see also Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) (product feature functional if
essential to use or purpose or if affects cost or quality of product). See generally 3 L. ALTMAN,
CALLMAN UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 19.33 (1983) (discussing
functional product features); Zelnick, The Doctrine of Functionality, 73 TRADE-MARK REP.
128, 128-50 (1983) (discussing history and court application of doctrine of functionality to
promote free competition). In light of Leschen and Inwood, the issue whether color alone can
gain federal trademark protection remains open. See infra notes 170-260 and accompanying text
(suggesting that color alone may gain federal trademark protection).
10. See, e.g., North Shore Laboratories Corp. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 523 (5th Cir.
1983) (courts uniformly have rejected exclusive rights to color as trademark); Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 n.6 (2d Cir. 1979) (one cannot
acquire trademark of color alone); Quabaug rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154,
161 (1st Cir. 1977) (same); Midwest Plastics Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., 285 F.2d 747,
750 (10th Cir. 1960) (basic colors cannot acquire secondary meaning because basic colors belong
to public); Mershon Co. v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879, 883 (9th Cir.) (finding color alone
unprotectable as trademark), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955); Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss
Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 9 (7th cir. 1950) (producer cannot monopolize multi-striping to
distinguish goods); Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir.) (no
exclusive right found to use red & white labels), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949); Deere & Co.
v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 96 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (color per se not capable of
appropriation as trademark), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983). But see In re Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (granting trademark registration of pink
for home insulation). See generally 3 L. ALTMAN, supra note 9, § 18.13 (overall color cannot
designate trade identity); J. GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.11 (color per se not protectable as
trademark); I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:16 (1973) (same).
11. 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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and federal policy interests to protect color alone as a trademark. 2
In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the appellant, Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. (OCF) was a manufacturer of fibrous glass home insulation. I I
On January 25, 1980, OCF applied with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (Office) for trademark registration of the color pink,
which OCF had applied to the entire surface of OCF's insulation product.
4
OCF claimed entitlement to registration under section 1052(f) of the Lanham
Act, which provides for the registration of marks that have become distinctive
of the registrant's goods in commerce. 5 A mark has acquired distinctiveness,
otherwise known as secondary meaning,' 6 when the mark has lost the mark's
natural meaning and has begun to symbolize the goods of a particular
supplier.' 7 A mark may acquire distinctiveness through extensive advertising
or through substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce.'
8
To establish acquired distinctiveness, OCF presented substantial evidence
to the Office in support of OCF's registration application.' 9 For example,
12. See id. at 1118-28 (considering trademark registration of pink applied to entire surface
of home insulation); see also infra notes 62-149 and accompanying text (discussing holding and
reasoning of Federal Circuit in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.).
13. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1195, 1196 (1984), rev'd,
774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
14. See Appendix for Appellant at 1, In re Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d
1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (OCF application for trademark registration on Principle Register); see
also supra note 2 (discussing registration process).
15. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1196; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982) (providing for
registration of marks that have acquired distinctiveness); see also supra note 2 (detailed discussion
of § 1052 of Lanham Act).
16. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 15.2(F). One commentator has noted that two
synonyms exist for the term "secondary meaning" that judges have commonly referred to in
the judges' opinions decided under state common law principles. Id. The Lanham Act has used
the term "has become distinctive," and the 1938 Restatement of torts has used "special
significance." Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(g) (1982) (providing for registration of marks that have
become distinctive); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (1938) (referring to special significance of
product designation); see also infra text accompanying notes 16-17 (defining secondary meaning);
infra notes 71-82, 126-36, 218-26 and accompanying text (discussing cases addressing secondary
meaning).
17. Diamond, Untangling the Confusion in Trademark Terminology, 73 TRADE-MARK
REP. 290, 293 (1983); see J. GILsoN, supra note 2, § 2.09. One commentator has stated that if
marks do not perform the classical trademark functions of identifying and distinguishing an
owner's product immediately upon adoption and use, the marks are unprotectable as trademarks
unless the marks acquire secondary meaning. J. GtLsoN, supra note 2, § 2.09; see supra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing trademark functions). Through extensive use and advertising
of the mark, the mark may acquire a secondary meaning, which identifies in the mind of the
buyer the source of the products and distinguishes the products from the products of others. J.
GILsoN, supra note 2, § 2.09. Marks that have acquired secondary meaning generally are
protectible as trademarks unless overriding public policies against monopolization and in favor
of free competition exist. See id. § 2.09 [2] (discussing instances when public policy overrides
secondary meaning to prevent trademark protection).
18. J. GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.09; see infra notes 124-35, 216-25, 255-56 and accom-
panying text (discussing what may constitute extensive advertising or substantially continuous
use).
19. See Record at 11-81, Owens-Corning (evidence presented by OCF to Patent and
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OCF submitted the affidavit testimony of OCF's Vice President of Marketing
Communications. 20 The affidavit stated that OCF had used OCF's pink mark
in conjunction with OCF home insulation since 1956.21 The affidavit further
noted that OCF had spent more than 42 million dollars from 1972 to 1981
advertising OCF's pink product on television and radio, and in newspapers
and magazines.2 2 The affidavit also stated that OCF had devoted additional
expenditures to promotional materials. 23 The OCF Vice President's affidavit
finally asserted that the results of an independent survey showed that
consumer recognition of OCF as the manufacturer of pink insulation rose
from forty-one percent in 1980 to fifty percent in 1981.24 In addition to
providing the affidavit, OCF presented the actual consumer survey evaluation 25
and numerous sample brochures to the Office as evidence of the acquired
Trademark Office to establish acquired distinctiveness); see also infra notes 20-26 and accom-
panying text (discussing evidence offered by OCF to Patent and Trademark Office).
20. See Record at I1, 15, Owens-Coming (two sworn affadavits by OCF Vice President
of Marketing Communications concerning acquired distinctiveness of OCF pink mark).
21. Id. at 11.
22. Id. at 11-12; see id. at 67 (listing over 80 television advertisement spots in which OCF
advertised pink insulation from August 17, 1980, to January 17, 1981); see also id. at 58 (listing
consumer magazines carrying OCF advertisements).
23. Id. at 12; see id. at 24-81. During proceedings before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (OCF) presented to the Trademark Examiner
sample brochures promoting OCF's pink insulation. Id. The brochures, included in the Appendix
for the Appellant, reflect OCF's promotion of pink in connection with OCF's insulation
product. Id. Some brochures used slogans, such as "Plant Some Pink Insulation In Your Attic"
and "We'll Help You Keep Your Customer's Igloo Cool With The Pink Cooler," to promote
sales of pink insulation. Id. at 32-39. Other brochures featured the cartoon characters, "Big
Pink" or "Pink Panther." Id. at 40-81. OCF's April 23, 1981 amendment of OCF's January
25, 1980 registration application noted that the brochures featuring Pink Panther illustrated the
then current OCF television advertisements. Id. at 8.
24. See id. at 13-14. The affidavit of OCF's Vice President of Marketing Communications
(Vice President) described a consumer survey entitled "Unaided Awareness of Manufacturer of
Pink Insulation: Male Homeowners." Id. The affadavit stated that Chilton Research conducted
the survey of Ogililvy & Mather, Inc. of New York City upon the request of OCF. Id. at 13.
The affadavit also summarized the telephone interview responses to the question "To the best
of your knowledge, what manufacturer makes pink insulation?" Id. at 14. According to the
consumer survey report, the survey results reflected only the responses of male homeowners.
Id. at 20. The surveyor excluded the responses of female homeowners because the female
interviewees showed little intent to purchase insulation. Id. Of 301 males interviewed in June
1980, 4107o responded "Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.," to the question "... . what manufac-
turer makes pink insulation?" Id. at 21. 14% of those interviewed in June 1980 responded with
the name of another manufacturer. Id. In January 1981, 50% of the 801 male homeowners
interviewed responded correctly with "Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.," and 14% responded
incorrectly with the name of another manufacturer. Id. OCF's Vice President suggested in the
Vice President's affadavit that the increase in consumer recognition of OCF as the manufacturer
of pink insulation was due to OCF's Pink Panther advertising campaign. Id. In support of that
assertion, the Vice President attached to the affadavit a magazine article describing the Pink
Panther campaign as a "big splash." Id. at 15; see id. at 22 (magazine article entitled "Mfr.
promotions boost insulation traffic").
25. See id. at 16-21 (consumer survey report).
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distinctiveness of the color pink in the use of OCF home insulation. 26
The Examiner for the Office's Trademarks Examining Operation 7 re-
viewed the evidence of acquired distinctiveness presented by OCF and found
OCF's pink mark unregistrable as a trademark for OCF home insulation. 2
The Examiner reasoned that despite OCF's extensive evidence of consumer
recognition of the color pink in relation to OCF's insulation, OCF could not
register the mark because of the nature of the mark. 29 Specifically, the
Examiner relied on case precedent to conclude that color alone indiscrimi-
nately applied to the entire surface of a product could not function as a
trademark. 0 Since OCF had applied the color pink indiscriminately to the
entire surface of OCF's insulation, the Examiner denied registration of the
OCF pink mark.3
26. See id. at 24-81 (sample brochures).
27. See supra note 2 (discussing role of Examiner in trademark registration process).
28. See Record at 4, 82, 89, Owens-Corning. In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
the Examiner for the Patent and Trademark Office's Trademarks Examining Operation (Ex-
aminer) first refused to register Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.'s (OCF) pink mark on November
3, 1980. Id. at 4. Based on OCF's application and drawing of OCF's pink insulation, the
Examiner found that OCF's mark constituted a configuration or shape of the goods and was,
thus, merely descriptive of OCF insulation. Id. The Examiner concluded that in the absence of
a showing of acquired distinctiveness, the descriptive mark was unregistrable. Id. On April 23,
1981, OCF amended OCF's original application to claim only the color pink, not the shape of
OCF insulation, as a trademark. Id. at 5. OCF included in the amended registration package
evidence of the pink mark's acquired distinctiveness. Id. at 11-81; see supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text (discussing evidence presented to Examiner to establish acquired distinctive-
ness). On January 11, 1982, the Examiner affirmed the examiner's former denial of registration
after considering OCF's supplemental evidence. Record at 82, Owens-Corning; see supra notes
29-31 and accompanying text (discussing Examiner's rationale in denying registration of pink
mark).
29. Record at 82, Owens-Corning.
30. Id. (citing In re The AFA Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 772, 774-75 (T.T.A.B. 1977);
Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 348, 350 (C.C.P.A.), aff'd 508 F.2d
824 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Ritchie Mfg. Co., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 291, 292 (T.T.A.B. 1971)).
31. Record at 82, Owens-Corning. In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp. (OCF) submitted to the Examiner a second amendment to OCF's
original registration application on July 2, 1982. Id. at 83-87. In the second amendment OCF
argued that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board cases upon which the Examiner had relied
to deny registration were distinguishable from the OCF facts. Id. at 85; see supra note 30
(listing cases on which Examiner relied in refusing to register pink mark). Specifically, OCF
stated that in the cases cited by the Examiner the applicants had not presented evidence of
secondary meaning. Record at 85, Owens-Corning. OCF proceeded to discuss the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board's grant of trademark registration in In re Hehr Mfg. Co. upon a
showing of secondary meaning. Id. at 85-86 (citing In re Hehr Mfg., 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381,
383 (TTAB), aff'd, 279 F.2d 526 (C.C.P.A. 1960)); see infra note 115 and accompanying text
(discussing Hehr). On February 1, 1983, the Examiner made a final decision in response to
OCF's second amendment. Record at 89, Owens-Corning. The Examiner distinguished In re
Hehr from the OCF application on the basis that In re Hehr involved the registrability of red
square labels whereas Owens-Corning's application concerned the registrability of the color pink
applied to the entire surface of the insulation. Id. The Examiner, therefore, reaffirmed the
Examiner's former decision that the color pink alone was unregistrable as a trademark for OCF
home insulation. Id.
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OCF appealed the Examiner's decision to the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (TTAB) . 2 The TTAB considered whether the color pink
applied uniformly to the surface of home insulation could constitute a valid
trademark." In determining the registrability of OCF's pink mark, the TTAB
first acknowledged that a large body of prior TTAB decisions and past
federal circuit court decisions had denied protection to marks consisting
solely of color.3 4 The TTAB noted, however, that several federal circuit
courts and the TTAB had granted trademark registration to colors that
formed part of an arbitrary, distinctive design or were arranged in an
arbitrary, distinctive design .3  An arbitrary, distinctive design is a design
randomly applied to goods in a manner that does not describe or suggest
characteristics of the product, but serves the classical trademark functions
of identification and distinction. 6 In considering whether the OCF mark was
an arbitrary, distinctive design, the TTAB examined the TTAB's earlier
decision in In re Shaw37 denying trademark registration of green suede covers
for books.38 In In re Shaw colored book covers were popular in the book
32. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. 1196; see supra note 2 (describing appellate review of
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decisions).
33. See Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1196-99 (considering registrability of OCF pink);
see also infra notes 34-60 and accompanying text (discussing rationale and holding of Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.).
34. See Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1196 (citing judicial decisions denying protection
of color marks); see also, e.g., Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824, 827 (C.C.P.A.
1975) (half yellow and half orange coloring for fishing floats found to lack distinctiveness);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that
automobile manufacturer had no exclusive rights in color blue under color depletion theory);
Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 9 (7th Cir. 1950) (multi-striping of candy
wrapper denied protection under functionality doctrine); Campbell Soup v. Armour's Co., 175
F.2d 795, 789 (3d Cir. 1949) (red and white for canned food labels found unprotectable under
color depletion theory). See generally infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text (discussing
various doctrines under which courts have denied protection of colored marks).
35. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1197; see, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc.
v. Pussycat, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1979) (uniform consisting of white boots, white
shorts, blue blouse, star-studded vest and belt deemed arbitrary, distinctive design); In re Data
Packaging Corp., 453 F.2d 1300, 1302 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (contrasting colored band design found
distinctive of owner's computer tape reels); In re Esso Standard Oil Co., 305 F.2d 495, 498
(C.C.P.A. 1962) (label consisting of colored brands, oval frames, and dots found registrable as
arbitrary distinctive design); supra note 120 (discussing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.); supra note 121 (discussing In re Data Packaging Corp.). See generally
infra note 36 and accompanying text (defining arbitrary, distinctive design).
36. See J. McCRTHY, supra note 10, § 11:2. One commentator has described marks of
arbitrary, distinctive design as one of the most common types of inherently distinctive marks.
Id. Inherently distinctive marks are protectible as trademarks immediately upon use and require
no proof of secondary meaning. Id.; see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing
secondary meaning). The term "arbitrary" denotes that the ordinary meaning of the mark is
applied to the goods without descriptive or suggestive significance. J. McCARTHY, supra note
10, § 11:4(A). See generally id. § 11:4(c) (giving examples of arbitrary marks).
37. 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 253 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
38. Owens.Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1197; see In re Shaw, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 255 (refusing
to register green suede covers for books).
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industry when the manufacturer sought registration of the green mark under
the theory of acquired distinctiveness. 39 In addition, the manufacturer had
applied the color green to the entire surface of the manufacturer's book
covers.4 The TTAB, in In re Shaw, therefore concluded that the book
cover's green coloring lacked the arbitrary distinctiveness of design necessary
to distinguish the applicant's books from the books of other manufacturers. 4
Although insulation manufacturers generally did not apply color uniformly
to insulation,42 the TTAB in Owens-Corning held that In re Shaw and other
case precedent precluded the registration of the OCF mark under the theory
of arbitrary distinctiveness of design because OCF had applied the color
pink to the entire surface of OCF insulation and not in combination with
other distinguishing matter.
4 3
Finding the OCF pink mark unregistrable in Owens-Corning under the
arbitrary distinctiveness of design theory, the TTAB next considered whether
the functionality doctrine would bar protection of the color pink. 4 Under
the functionality doctrine, courts deny protection of functional product
features, those features that are essential or useful to the performance or
efficiency of a product. 45 In considering the functionality doctrine, the TTAB
relied on the decision of Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc.,46 in which the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa had refused
to protect the color, John Deere green, for farm machinery.47 The district
court noted in Deere that tractor owners generally bought tractor attachments
in a color that matched the owner's tractors.4 8 The district court, therefore,
deemed John Deere green a functional mark, a mark that is essential or
useful to the performance or efficiency of a product.4 9 Adopting the doctrine
39. In re Shaw, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 255; see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text
(discussing theory of acquired distinctiveness).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Owens-Coming, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1198 (no evidence in records show widespread
industry practice of dyeing insulation).
43. See id. at 1197 (distinguishing Owens-Corning from cases protecting colors arbitrarily
applied in designs on basis that OCF applied pink to entire surface of goods).
44. Id. at 1197-98 (discussing functionality doctrine's application to Owens-Corning).
45. See supra note 9 (discussing doctrine of functionality).
46. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
47. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1197-98; see Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 94-101 (consid-
ering protectibility of John Deere green for farm machinery).
48. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 98.
49. See id.; see also supra note 9 (discussing functional marks). In Deere & Co. v.
Farmland, Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa considered
whether the color, John Deere green, was an aesthetically functional mark in relation to farm
machinery. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 98; see Note, supra note 8, at 364 (aesthetically functional
mark is pleasing in appearance and contributes substantially to value of goods). The district
court noted that the early decisions under the doctrine of aesthetic functionality denied protection
of aesthetic product features that were important to the commercial success of the product
regardless of whether the product feature contributed to the efficient performance of the
product. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 97-98; see, e.g., International Order of Job's Doughters v.
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of functionality, the district court in Deere denied trademark protection of
the green color applied uniformly to the surface of farm equipment5 0 In
light of Deere, the TTAB in Owens-Corning concluded that the functionality
doctrine did not bar the registration of OCF's pink mark because the color
pink served no function, aesthetic or otherwise, in relation to home insula-
tion.5'
Refusing to recognize the color pink as a functional product feature, the
TTAB next addressed whether OCF's pink mark applied to the entire surface
of OCF's insulation was protectable as product ornamentation. 52 Product
ornamentation is any feature that gives goods a unique external appearance. 53
The TTAB stated that ornamentation functioned primarily as a trademark
to identify and distinguish the trademark owner's goods.14 In determining
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980) (design signifying fraternal organization
used on jewelry held aesthetically functional as mode of expressing allegiance), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 941 (1981); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952) (floral
design on hotel china denied protection because design important to product's commercial
success); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941) (rounded
bib pocket on overalls denied protection because mark contributed materially to product
marketability). The Deere court stated, however, that a more recent decision interpreted the
aesthetic functionality doctrine to bar, in the interest of free competition, only those aesthetic
features related to the use of the product. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 98; see Keene v. Paraflex
Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 826-28 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying protection of commercial lighting
fixture under doctrine of aesthetic functionality because of marketable architectural compata-
bility between fixture and building design). Adopting the more recent approach, the Deere court
concluded that John Deere green was aesthetically related to the use of John Deere farm
machinery because farmers selected tractor attachments in a color that matched the farmer's
tractors. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 98. The Deere court, therefore, refused to extend trademark
protection to the color John Deere green. Id.
50. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 101; see supra note 9 (discussing doctrine of functionality).
51. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1198. In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality did not bar
the registration of the color pink for home insulation. Id. Unlike the situation in Deere & Co.
v. Farmhand, Inc., insulation consumers do not purchase insulation in a color to match the
consumer's home furnishings because once installed, the insulation is out of public view. See
Brief for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks at 11-12, In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (once installed, insulation is out of sight); cf. Deere, 560
F. Supp. at 98 (John Deere green held aesthetically functional because consumers preferred
matching farm equipment); supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing Deere).
52. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1198-99.
53. See, e.g., Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enter., Inc. 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir.
1981) (considering protectibility of ornamental floral design for luggage); Plastilite Corp. v.
Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824, 826 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (addressing registrability of ornamental
yellow and orange coloring for fishing floats); Application of Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 953-
55 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (considering registrability of ornamentation consisting of polka dot banded
label for household cleanser container).
54. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1198; see, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys,
Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983) (ornamental mark may indicate product origin); Plastilite
Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824, 826 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (ornamentation not barred from
registration if ornamentation primarily indicates product source); Application of David Crystal,
Inc., 296 F.2d 771, 773 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (fact that design is ornamental does not preclude
design from becoming valid trademark); Application of Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 953
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whether OCF's pink mark of ornamentation functioned as a trademark, the
TTAB reviewed OCF's evidence paralleling evidence of secondary meaning
and consisting of exclusive and continuous use, substantial advertising ex-
penditures, and a survey indicating consumer recognition of OCF as the
manufacturer of pink insulation." The TTAB found that OCF's evidence
did not establish that the pink color functioned as a trademark under the
ornamentation doctrine. 6 The TTAB reasoned that OCF had failed to
indicate the degree to which OCF advertisements had emphasized the color
pink.17 The TTAB also stated that OCF had failed to indicate the extent to
which OCF had used the sample advertisements of record. 8 Furthermore,
the TTAB criticized the survey for failing to show that buyers of home
insulation had associated pink insulation with a single source.5 9 The TTAB,
therefore, affirmed the Examiner's decision to refuse trademark registration
of the color pink.6 OCF appealed the TTAB's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal circuit.
61
In determining whether the TTAB properly denied OCF trademark
registration, the Federal Circuit in Owens-Corning initially addressed the
history of trademark protection for color before the Lanham Act.62 The
(C.C.P.A. 1955) (ornamental mark registrable if mark adopted and used primarily to identify
and to distinguish product). But cf. Plastilite, 508 F.2d at 827 (mere ornamentation consisting
of orange and yellow coloring for fishing floats found unregistrable); Swift, 223 F.2d at 953
(mere ornamentation or trade-dress not subject to trademark registration because ornamentation
only gives goods distinctive external appearance.); In re Paramount Pictures Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1111, 1113 (T.T.A.B. 1982) (merely ornamental marks do not function as indicators of
product source).
55. See Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1198-99 (considering OCF's evidence offered to
show secondary meaning); see also supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing OCF
evidence of secondary meaning). In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) refused to consider Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.'s (OCF) claim
for registration under the Lanham Act's secondary meaning provision. Owens-Corning, 221
U.S.P.Q. at 1198 n.3; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982) (providing for registration of marks upon
showing of secondary meaning). The TTAB in Owens-Corning, however, considered the same
evidence that courts use to determine the existence of secondary meaning when the TTAB
considered whether OCF pink, as ornamentation, functioned as a trademark. Owens-Corning,
221 U.S.P.Q. at 1198. The TTAB then noted that proving that a single color applied uniformly
to the surface of goods functioned as a trademark required greater evidence of consumer
recognition, use, and advertising than providing that an arbitrary and distinctive colored design
functioned as a trademark. Id. The TTAB, however, did not specify the amount of evidence
necessary to prove that ornamentation applied to a product functioned as a trademark. Id.
Instead the TTAB merely stated that the evidence which OCF presented was insufficient to
establish that OCF pink functioned as a trademark. Id. at 1199. See generally J. McCARTHY,
supra note 10, §§ 7:6-7:11 (discussing evidence required in proving that ornamentation functioned
as trademark).





61. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118.
62. Id. at 1118-19.
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Owens-Corning court first examined the 1906 United States Supreme Court
case of A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co.63 In
Leschen, the Supreme Court recognized, in dictum, that color in the form
of a design, such as a square or circle, could constitute a valid trademark.64
Relying on the popular color depletion theory, the Court in Leschen,
however, doubted the validity of color alone as trademark. 6 The color
depletion theory recognizes that a limited number of colors exist. 66 According
to the theory, manufacturers' ownership of exclusive trademark rights in the
use of primary colors eventually would deplete the number of available
colors. 67 Consequently, new manufacturers in the industry, denied the use of
colorful trademarks, would be unable to compete effectively in the market.
68
The Owens-Corning court acknowledged that the federal courts generally
have adopted the Supreme Court's earlier dictum denying trademark protec-
tion of color alone.69 The Federal Circuit noted, however, that at least two
courts had protected single colors as trademarks upon the showing of
acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning.70 First, the Owens-Corning
court noted that in Clifton Manufacturing Co. v. Crawford-Austin Manu-
facturing Co.,7' the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas protected reddish-brown
coloring for tents, tarpaulins, and wagon covers.7 2 In Clifton, the Texas
63. Id. at 1118; see A. Leschen & Sons rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201
U.S. 166, 166-72 (1906) (considering protectibility of colored wire strand woven into wire rope).
64. Leschen, 201 U.S. at 171; see supra note 9 (discussing A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co.
v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co.)
65. Leschen, 201 U.S. at 171; see supra note 9 (discussing Leschen).
66. See J. GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.11 (only seven primary colors exist); J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 10, § 7:16 (very few colors are available for use in any industry).
67. J. GiLsoN, supra note 2, § 2.11; see J. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:16 (if seller could
appropriate color, sellers would soon deplete all colors); see also Cooper, Trademark Aspects
of Pharmaceutical Product Design, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 1, 23 (1980) (traditional color depletion
doctrine asserts that list of available colors will diminish if manufacturers monopolize major
hues).
68. Cf. J. GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.11 (color depletion doctrine is based on federal policy
against monopoly); J. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:16 (same).
69. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118; see, e.g., James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel &
Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9 (6th Cir.) (color except in connection with definite, arbitrary
symbol is not subject to trademark monopoly), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 674 (1942); In re Security
Eng'g Co., 113 F.2d 494, 496 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (color must be part of particular design to
constitute trademark); In re General Petroleum Corp., 49 F.2d 966, 968 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (as
rule seller cannot monopolize color alone to distinguish product); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Decca
Records, 51 F. Supp. 493, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (color must be in form of design to constitute
trademark).
70. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118-19; see Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 147 F.2d 407, 415 (6th Cir. 1945) (protecting yellow for taxicabs); Clifton Mfg.
Co. v. Crawford-Austin Mfg. Co., 12 S.W.2d 1098, 1102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (protecting
reddish-brown coloring for canvas products); see also infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text
(discussing Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Crawford-Austin Mfg. Co. and Yellow Cab Transit Co. v.
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co.).
71. 12 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
72. See id. at 1102 (enjoining competitor's confusing and similar use of reddish-brown
mark for canvas products).
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appellate court considered whether the reddish brown color had acquired
secondary meaning. 7 Clifton Manufacturing Co. (Clifton) had used the
reddish-brown color for three years in commerce. 74 Clifton claimed that
buyers asked for Clifton's canvas products by the coloring alone. 75 The
appellate court, therefore, enjoined Crawford-Austin Manufacturing Co.
from producing inferior canvas products with reddish-brown coloring similar
to Clifton's colored mark.76 The Owens-Corning court next reviewed the case
of Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 7n in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit protected Louisville
Taxicab & Transfer Co.'s (Louisville Taxi's) long established use of the color
yellow color for taxicabs. 78 The Sixth Circuit found Louisville Taxi's long
established use of the color yellow protectable under the theory of secondary
meaning. 79 Louisville Taxi had painted its cabs yellow with black trimming
and black fenders and had used the word yellow in its various trade names
for over twenty-five years.80 In addition, Louisville Taxi's extensive advertis-
ing campaign resulted in the public's recognition of the Louisville Taxi color
scheme and trade names.8' The Sixth Circuit, therefore, enjoined Yellow Cab
Transit Co. (Yellow Cab) from painting its taxicabs yellow to prevent public
confusion between Louisville and Yellow Cab taxicabs.82 The decisions of
73. See id. at 1100-01. In Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Crawford-Austin Co., the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas stated that the rule governing the use of geographical names as trademarks
governed the use of single color marks. Id. at 1100. A geographical mark describes the place
where the manufacturer makes the product bearing the mark. J. GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.07.
As a general rule, geographical marks must have secondary meaning to receive trademark
protection. Clifton, 12 S.W.2d at 1100; see J. GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.07 (discussing trademark
protection of geographical marks). The Clifton court, therefore, concluded that the court would
protect a color mark that had secondary meaning. Clifton, 12 S.W.2d at 1101.
74. See Clifton, 12 S.W.2d at 1099 (Clifton began manufacturing reddish-brown canvas
products in June 1926).
75. Id. at 1100.
76. Id. at 1102.
77. 147 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1945).
78. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118-19; see Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 147 F.2d at 415 (protecting color yellow for taxicabs).
79. See Yellow Cab, 147 F.2d at 415. In Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab &
Transfer Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that under the
color depletion theory, Louisville Taxicab & Transfer co. (Louisville Taxi) had no right to the
exclusive use of the primary color yellow. Id. The Sixth Circuit, nevertheless, protected Louisville
Taxi's use of yellow cabs for transportation services in the city of Louisville upon a showing
of secondary meaning. Id.; see infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing Yellow Cab's
evidence indicating secondary meaning of yellow mark). Id.
80. See Yellow Cab, 147 F.2d at 409 (Louisville adopted yellow mark in 1919).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 415. In Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered Yellow Cab Transit Co. (Yellow
Cab) to identify Yellow Cab's building in the city of Louisville with the words, "Yellow Transit
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Clifton and Yellow Cab, thus, left the door open to the Federal Circuit's
further examination of the registrability of OCF's pink mark.83
Acknowledging that case precedent did not necessarily bar the possibility
of protection for color, the majority in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
considered the legislative history of the Lanham Act in determining whether
to grant protection to OCF pink as a trademark for OCF insulation. 84 The
Owens-Corning court first examined the 1946 Report by the Senate Com-
mittee on Patents, which described the purpose of the Lanham Act .8 The
Report indicated that Congress had attempted to compile all federal statutes
concerning trademarks into one piece of legislation, the Lanham Act.86 The
Report also suggested that Congress had intended to revise the existing
federal statutes to conform to current commercial practices. 87 In addition,
the Report revealed that Congress had intended to protect the public from
the deception resulting from imitated marks and false trade descriptions. 8
Furthermore, through the enactment of the Lanham Act, Congress had
sought to protect the established goodwill of the trademark owner in the
product.8 9 Finally, Congress had intended to make trademark registration
simpler and more liberal9 The OCF court emphasized that the 1946 Senate
Report had concluded that courts should construe the Lanham Act liberally
to afford trademarks the greatest protection possible in light of the policy
interests designed to promote consumer free choice and product goodwill in
quality goods. 91
Company, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Freight Lines." Id. The Sixth Circuit also ordered
Yellow Cab to identify Yellow Cab trucks and taxicabs in the same manner. Id. The circuit
court further stated that Yellow Cab must paint Yellow Cab taxicabs a color other than yellow.
Id.
83. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119-28 (considering registrability of OCF pink mark
for home insulation); see also infra notes 84-149 and accompanying text (discussing Federal
Circuit's analysis of OCF mark for trademark registration).
84. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119.
85. Id.; see 1946 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1274-77 (discussing purposes of Lanham
Act).
86. 1946 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1276; see supra note 5 (discussing existence of
widely scattered federal trademark statutes before passage of Lanham Act).
87. See 1946 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1276. The 1946 Senate Report by the
Senate Committee on Patents stated that ideas concerning trademark law had changed in the 40
years since the passage of the Trademark Act of 1905. Id. The Senate Report further noted
that federal statutes did not reflect the commercial development of trademarks. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 1276. The report of the 1946 Senate Committee on Patents stated that
federal law should protect the trademark owner's time and money invested in advertising the
owner's mark from misappropriation by market competitors. Id.; see D. BURGE, supra note 2,
at 120-21. One commentator has explained that trademarks are linked to the goodwill of the
trademark owner's business. D. BURGE, supra note 2, at 121. The commentator noted that
trademarks assure the public of quality and consistency in trademark bearing products. Id. The
commentator, therefore, concluded that a manufacturer's trademark may constitute one of the
manufacturer's most valuable assets. Id.
90. See 1946 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1274 (supporting liberal trademark
registration's increased protection of trademarks).
91. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119 (legislative history of Lanham Act suggests that
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The Federal Circuit in Owens-Corning explained that judicial decisions
following the passage of the Lanham Act reflected the liberal view of
trademark protection embodied in the Lanham Act. 92 The Federal Circuit
stated that those judicial decisions no longer had barred automatically the
registration of colored marks.93 Upon review of the case law concerning color
protection, the Owens-Corning court concluded that the proper standard for
registrability of colored marks involved a five-part test. 94 The first prong of
the test required the court to determine whether the color was functional. 9
If the color was functional, then trademark protection for the color would
be unavailable. 96 If the color was not functional, the next question was
whether the color was solely ornamental. 97 If the color was solely ornamental,
the Federal Circuit would deny trademark protection.98 If the color was not
solely ornamental, the circuit court would apply the third prong of the test
that focused on whether the color was part of an arbitrary, distinctive
design. 99 If the color was part of an arbitrary, distinctive design, the color
was protectable if the marks satisfied the fifth prong of the test addressing
federal policy.' °° If the color was not an element of an arbitrary, distinctive
public policy requires trademarks to receive greatest possible protection); 1946 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 1277 (same).
92. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120 (post-Lanham Act case law suggests that all
marks capable of being or becoming distinctive of goods are protectible); see, e.g., In re
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1344 (C.C.P.A. (1982) (case remanded to
determine registrability of spray pump container); Application of Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 565
F.2d 679, 682-83 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (stylized key logo as jewelry design held registrable);
Application of World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (candy
wrapping held registrable); In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (polka dot
banded label found registrable).
93. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120; see infra notes 105-07, 120-22, 132-36 and accom-
panying text (discussing post-Lanham Act decisions protecting color marks).
94. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120-28 (applying doctrines of functionality, orna-
mentation, arbitrary distinctiveness of design, secondary meaning and federal public policy in
addressing color protection issue).
95. See id. at 1120-23 (discussing functionality of OCF mark); infra notes 105-12 and
accompanying text (same); see also supra note 9 (discussing functionality doctrine).
96. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120-23 (discussing functionality of OCF pink); infra
notes 105-12 and accompanying text (same); see also supra note 9 (discussing functionality
doctrine).
97. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124-25 (considering significance of OCF pink as
ornamental mark); infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (same); see also supra notes 53-
54 and accompanying text (defining ornamentation doctrine and explaining that mere ornamen-
tation does not identify and distinguish goods primarily).
98. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124-25 (considering significance of OCF pink as
ornamental mark); see also infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (defining ornamentation
doctrine).
99. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120, 1123-25 (addressing doctrine of arbitrary
distinctiveness of design); infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (same); see also supra note
36 and accompanying text (defining arbitrary distinctive design).
100. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122-24 (considering federal policy interests of free
competition and trademark protection embodied in color depletion and shade confusion
doctrines); infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text (same); see also supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text (defining color depletion doctrine).
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design, the circuit court next would consider whether the color had secondary
meaning.'"' If the color did not have secondary meaning, the Federal Circuit
would deny trademark protection.' 2 If the circuit court found that the color
had secondary meaning, the Federal Circuit would proceed to consider the
final prong of the test concerning federal policy considerations.0 3 Only if no
overriding federal policy interest existed would the Federal Circuit then grant
protection of a color mark.'04
In determining whether the OCF pink mark was a functional feature of
home insulation, the Federal Circuit in Owens-Corning reviewed federal
circuit court decisions that had found functional color marks such as
reflective, colored coatings for fence posts, 05 blue dots for flashbulbs,1 6 and
the color green for farm machinery. 07 The Federal Circuit concluded that
the relevant considerations under the functionality doctrine were whether the
color mark served a utilitarian or economical purpose and whether alternative
color marks existed to maintain free competition."' On the issue of func-
tionality, the Owens-Corning court found persuasive that OCF was the only
manufacturer among the few insulation producers who dyed fibrous glass
insulation a color different from the insulation's natural yellow-white color. '9
The Federal Circuit further found no evidence in the record to suggest that
OCF competitors desired or needed to dye the competitors' insulation
products. ' 0 The Owens-Corning court, therefore, concluded that OCF's use
101. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124-28 (applying secondary meaning doctrine); infra
notes 124-37 and accompanying text (same); see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text
(defining secondary meaning).
102. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124-28 (applying secondary meaning doctrine); infra
notes 124-37 and accompanying text (same); see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text
(defining secondary meaning).
103. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122-24 (considering policy interests of free compe-
tition and trademark protection embodied in color depletion and shade confusion doctrines);
infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text (same); see also supra notes 66-68 and accompanying
text (defining color depletion doctrine).
104. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122-24 (considering policy interests behind color
depletion and shade confusion theories); infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text (same).
105. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1121; see In re Pollak Steel Co., 314 F.2d 566, 570
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (denying registration of functional reflective coating applied to tops of fence
posts).
106. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1121; see Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp
Co., 247 F.2d 730, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1957) (despite showing of secondary meaning, functional
blue dot for flashbulbs denied protection).
107. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1121; see Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp.
85, 101 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (refusing to protect aesthetically functional green coloring for farm
equipment); see also supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing Deere & Co. v.
Farmhand, Inc.).
108. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1121; accord In re Morton-Norwick Prods., Inc., 671
F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (considering under functionality test whether color serve
utilitarian or economical purpose and whether alternative color existed).
109, Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122; see Record at 21, Owens-Corning (identifying only
four manufacturers of home insulation).
110. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122. But see id. at 1130 (Bissell, J., dissenting) (asserting
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of the color pink served no necessary function in relation to home insulation
and conferred no monopoly in the insulation market."' The Federal Circuit,
thus, found the functionality doctrine inapplicable in Owens-Corning."12
Finding the OCF mark non-functional, the Federal Circuit next consid-
ered the pink mark's status as mere ornamentation. "' The Owens-Corning
court noted that courts generally perceive color marks as ornamentation."
4
The Federal Circuit did not determine expressly whether the OCF's pink
mark was ornamental.' '5 The Owens-Corning court noted, however, that
whether the pink mark was incidentally ornamental was unimportant because
the mark's status as ornamentation would not preclude the mark's function-
ing primarily as a trademark." 6 The Federal Circuit explained that ornamental
marks also may obtain trademark protection under either the arbitrary
distinctive design doctrine or the secondary meaning doctrine. "7
Having found the issue of ornamentation irrelevant to the pink mark's
registrability, the Owens-Corning court addressed the issue of arbitrary
distinctiveness of design."" An arbitrary, distinctive design randomly com-
bines color with other distinguishing matter to identify and distinguish a
particular owner's goods."19 The Owens-Corning court first reviewed cases in
which federal circuit courts had granted protection of arbitrary distinctive
designs such as red, white, and blue cheerleading uniforms, 20 contrasting
that registration of OCF pink would grant OCF monopoly in insulation industry that OCF
already dominated); infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing dissent's argument
in Owens-Corning that color protection would result in monopoly of insulation market). In In
re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. the dissent noted that pink insulation was practically
synonymous with home insulation market. Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1130 (Bissell, J.,
dissenting). The dissent, therefore, concluded that if insulation manufacturers could not make
pink insulation, the manufacturers could not compete effectively in the insulation market. Id.
The dissent's fear of monopoly, however, is unreasonable because the record in Owens-Corning
did not indicate that OCF competitors desired or needed to dye the competitors' insulation pink
or any other color. Id. at 1122.
111. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123.
112. See id. at 1122 (registration of OCF pink for insulation not barred on basis of
functionality).
113. See id. at 1124-25 (considering significance of pink as ornamentation).
114. Id. at 1124.
115. See id. at 1124-25 (majority fails to determine whether OCF pink is ornamental mark).
116. Id. at 1124; see supra note 54 (listing cases finding that ornamental marks are
registrable if marks identify and distinguish owner's goods).
117. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124.
118. Id. at 1120, 1123-25.
119. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (defining arbitrary, distinctive design).
120. Id. at 1120; see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
207 (2d Cir. 1979). In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enjoined the defendant, Pussycat Cinema, from
distributing or exhibiting a film featuring a uniform similar to the ones worn by the plaintiff's
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 206-07. The Second Circuit found
the combination of white boots, white shorts, blue blouse, and white star-studed vest and belt
to be an arbitrary design worthy of trademark protection. Id. at 203-04.
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colored bands applied to computer reels,' 2' and red square labels applied to
automobile trailer windows.' 22 The Federal Circuit suggested, however, that
OCF's pink mark applied uniformly to the entire surface of OCF's insulation
product was not arbitrarily distinctive in design. 23
The Owens-Corning court next focused on whether OCF's mark had
secondary meaning under section 1052(f) of the Lanham Act. 24 Section
1052(f) of the Lanham Act provides that five years of substantially contin-
uous and exclusive use of a mark in commerce by the registration applicant
constitutes prima facie evidence of secondary meaning.' 25 The circuit court
noted that the exact type and amount of evidence needed to prove secondary
meaning depended on the facts of each case. 26 The Owens-Corning court,
however, stated that the registration applicant generally must submit evidence
concerning the applicant's use of the mark.' 27 According to the evidence
presented by OCF, OCF had used the pink mark exclusively and continuously
121. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120; see Application of Data Packaging Corp. held an
annular unspecified colored band applied to a particular location on computer tape reels
registrable as a trademark. Data, 453 F.2d at 1304. The court found the color contrasting band
distinctive of the product's origin although the design's specific color varied among Data
Packaging Corp. (Data) goods. Id. at 1302. The court further found no evidence that other
producers in the industry had used designs similar to Data's design on their products. Id. at
1303. Data's colored mark, therefore, retained its capacity to function as a trademark. Id.
122. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120; see Application of Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526,
527-28 (C.C.P.A. 1960). The United States Court of Customs and Patents Appeals (C.C.P.A.)
in Application of Hehr Mfg. Co. granted trademark registration of square red labels applied to
automobile trailer windows. Hehr, 279 F.2d at 527-28. Hehr Manufacturing Co. (Hehr)
submitted evidence that Hehr had used the red square mark continuously since 1950. Id. at
527. Hehr's evidence also showed that since 1954 Hehr had advertised its mobile home windows,
emphasizing the shape and color of the Hehr mark. Id. at 527-28. In addition, Hehr presented
evidence that Hehr had expended $112,000 in total advertising costs, and $30,000 specifically,
towards promoting the red square. Id. at 528. Hehr advertisement slogans included, "Look for
these red stickers: they are your guide to quality." Id. Finally, Hehr submitted the results of a
survey taken among trailer manufacturers to show that a majority of persons surveyed associated
the red square with Hehr's products. Id. The C.C.P.A. concluded that Hehr's red square mark
had acquired secondary meaning, and, thus, was entitled to registration. Id.
123. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124 (if mark is not inherently distinctive, mark is
registrable upon showing of secondary meaning); see also supra note 43 (arbitrary distinctive
mark is inherently distinctive).
124. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124-28 (considering secondary meaning doctrine);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1982) (providing for registration of marks with secondary meaning).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1982); see supra note 2 (discussing § 1052 of Lanham Act in
detail).
126. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125; accord American Footwear Corp. v. General
Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979) (court must determine secondary meaning
based on facts of each case, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); In re Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d
526, 528 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (same).
127. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125; see Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., Inc., 2 F.2d 402, 405
(3d Cir. 1924) (length of use usual but not exclusive standard to determine secondary meaning).
See generally J. Gilson, supra note 2, § 2.09[l] (length, manner, and exclusivity of use bear
directly on mark's secondary meaning).
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for 29 years.'28 The Federal Circuit also stated that the applicant generally
must show that the applicant's use of the mark has caused the consumer to
identify the mark with the source of the product. 29 In determining the extent
of consumer recognition of the OCF mark as an indicator of OCF home
insulation, the Owens-Corning court considered OCF's consumer survey. 30
In response to the TTAB's criticism that OCF failed to state the degree to
which advertisements focused on the color pink, 3' the circuit court stated
that the amount of advertising expenditures alone may serve as strong
evidence of secondary meaning. 13 2 The Federal Circuit, thus, stated that an
applicant need not show that the applicant specifically directed expenditures
to promote a mark when the applicant had made very large expenditures.'
The Owens-Corning court, therefore, found OCF's expenditure of over forty-
two million dollars made from 1972 to promote OCF's pink insulation highly
probative in determining secondary meaning.1' 4 Furthermore, the Federal
128. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125; see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing
OCF's exclusive and continuous use of pink mark since 1956).
129. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125.
130. Id. at 1125-1128; see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing OCF's
advertisement of pink insulation and OCF's consumer survey).
131. See Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1199 (criticising OCF evidence of secondary
meaning on ground that OCF failed to show that advertisements focused on color pink).
132. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125; accord Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc.,
427 F.2d 823, 829 n.10 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (amount of advertising alone is highly probative of
secondary meaning); see Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795
(5th Cir. 1983) ($400,000 advertising expenditures over five year period evidence of secondary
meaning); American Seventh Chemical, Inc., v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791,
792 (9th Cir. 1982) (annual advertising expenditure of $8,500,000 evidence of secondary
meaning); In re Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526, 528 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (advertising expenditures
of $112,000 found indicative of secondary meaning; In re Hollywood Brands, Inc., 214 F.2d
139, 141 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (only one-third of $1,135,000 devoted to promoting mark over six
year period found indicative of secondary meaning). But see American Footwear Corp. v.
General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979) (promotion expenditures exceeding
$20,000,000 insufficient to prove secondary meaning); Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan,
Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir.) ($3,000,000 spent in advertising found insufficient to show
secondary meaning), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); see also Bank of Texas v. Commerce
Southwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 1984) (in determining secondary meaning, results
achieved by advertising more important than amount spent); Zatarains, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795
(5th Cir. 1983) (same); Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
133. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125; see RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603
F.2d 1058, 1060 (2d Cir. 1979) (district court properly found plaintiff's thirty-six million dollar
advertising campaign highly probative of secondary meaning without regard to advertisement's
specific focus on mark); see also In re American Home Prods. Corp., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
327, 330 (TTAB 1985) (given plaintiff's advertising expenditure of eight million dollars,
plaintiff's failure to focus advertisements specifically on mark does not preclude trademark
protection); cf. Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985) (no
single type of evidence determinative and every type of evidence need not exist to prove
secondary meaning); Zatarains, 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Am. Footwear Corp.,
609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979) (same).
134. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125, 1127 (finding expensive, wide promotion of
pink mark in conjunction with OCF home insulation strong evidence of secondary meaning).
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Circuit recognized that OCF spend additional sums on promotional items
specifically highlighting OCF's pink mark. 3 Moreover, the Federal Circuit
stated without elaboration that the TTAB's criticism of the independent
survey for inhibiting multiple interviewee responses did not require outright
rejection of OCF's survey showing that fifty percent of the survey respond-
ents associated pink insulation with OCF. 36 The Federal Circuit, therefore,
concluded that OCF had established the secondary meaning of its mark.,37
Having found that OCF's pink mark had secondary meaning, the Owens-
Corning court finally considered whether overriding federal policy interests
of free competition and effective trademark protection warranted against the
registration of the OCF mark. 8 The Federal Circuit first addressed the
popular color depletion theory based on the federal policy against market
monopoly.3 9 The circuit court stated that when no competitive need, aesthetic
or otherwise, exists for colors to remain available to market competitors, as
in the case of Owens-Corning, the color depletion theory unreasonably
restricted the acquisition of trademark rights.' 40 The Owens-Corning court,
therefore, rejected the color depletion theory as inapplicable to OCF's
situation.' 4' The Federal Circuit next addressed the shade confusion theory
based on the federal policy in favor of effective trademark protection. 42
135. See id. at 1127; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing OCF
promotional items focusing on pink mark). In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp. (OCF) submitted evidence showing that OCF supplied insulation
dealers with point-of-sale advertising materials associated with OCF television campaigns.
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1127. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) had
criticized this evidence on the ground that OCF had failed to indicate the degree to which
dealers actually had used the advertising materials. Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1199. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit responded that the TTAB's objection
did not outweigh the total evidence of OCF's broad distribution and sales efforts. Owens-
Corning, 774 F.2d at 1127. The Federal Circuit further noted that OCF's offer of pink
promotional items, such as coffee mugs and stuffed animals, to real estate developers was
indicative of the pink mark's secondary meaning. Id.
136. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1127; see Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1199 (criti-
cizing OCF survey for inhibiting multiple responses); see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983) (23% telephone responses and 28%
personal responses associating mark with product source held sufficient to establish secondary
meaning); cf. Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d 862,
865-66 (7th Cir. 1983) (court credits survey showing 96.70 correct responses and rejects survey
showing 7.7% correct responses). But see Bank of Texas v. Commerce Southwest, Inc., 741
F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1984) (rejecting as evidence of secondary meaning telephone survey
showing that 58.7% of those interviewed had heard of "Bank of Texas"); Harlequin Enter.
Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 950 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981) (consumer survey showing
50% correctly identified mark with product source found inconclusive because of seller's
dominance in market).
137. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128.
138. See id. at 1122-24 (discussing color depletion and shade confusion theories).
139. Id. at 1122; cf. infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (federal policy interest exists
not to promote monopolies).
140. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1123; cf. infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (federal policy interest exists
to grant only effective trademark protection).
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According to the shade confusion theory, if courts protect color as trade-
mark, courts will have the difficult task of determining the likelihood that
the public will mistake similarly colored marks for the registered colored
mark. 43 To avoid such confusion, proponents of the shade confusion theory
suggest that courts should protect color as trademark."" The Owens-Corning
court found the task of measuring the likelihood of confusion in cases involving
colored marks no more complex than in cases involving word marks.' 5 Further-
more, the Federal Circuit noted that courts had analyzed variations in shade in
the past without apparent difficulty.' 6 The circuit court, therefore, found that
the shade confusion theory did not bar the registration of OCF's pink mark. 47
The Owens-Coming court concluded that the registration of OCF's mark would
not defeat the federal policy interests of promoting free competition and effective
trademark protection embodied in the color depletion and shade confusion
theories.' 48 The Federal Circuit, therefore, held that the TTAB clearly erred
in refusing registration pursuant to section 1052(f) of the Lanham Act of OCF's
nonfunctional, ornamental pink mark as a trademark for OCF home insula-
tion. 49
Despite the majority's holding that OCF pink was protectable as a
trademark, the dissent in Owens-Corning asserted that the Federal Court
should deny registration of the pink mark in light of case precedent, adverse
legal consequences, the sufficiency of current judicial protection, federal
policy considerations, and insufficient proof of secondary meaning.5 0 The
dissent first stated that all federal circuit courts confronted with the issue of
trademark protection for single color marks had followed the rule that color,
when not used in combination with other distinguishing matter, is not
protectable as a trademark."' Additionally, the dissent argued that the
Federal Circuit owed a certain degree of deference to the consistent decisions
143. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:16 (if infringement suits involve colored marks,
court must determine likelihood of shade confusion); see also supra note 3 (discussing likelihood
of confusion test for determining infringement liability).
144. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:16 (one reason to ban color appropriation is
possibility of shade confusion).
145. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123.
146. Id.; see, e.g., Wire Rope Corp. v. Secalt S.A., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 312, 315 (T.T.A.B.
1977) (considering whether registered red strand rope was confusingly similar to red and yellow
strand rope); In re Hodes-Lange Corp., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255, 256 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (brilliant
yellow band compared to bronzy-gold band to determine likelihood of confusion); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., v. Tallman Conduit Co., 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656, 657-58 (T.T.A.B. 1966)
(gold banded sewer pipe compared to orange banded sewer pipe to determine likelihood of
confusion).
147. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123.
148. See id. at 1125 (no public policy exists to prohibit OCF's registration of pink mark
under secondary meaning provision of Lanham Act).
149. Id. at 1128; see supra note 2 (discussing application of clearly erroneous standard of
review in trademark litigation).
150. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128-32 (Bissell, J. dissenting).
151. Id. at 1128-29. See supra note 10 (listing federal circuits currently adopting view that
color alone cannot constitute valid trademark).
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of the regional circuits.- 2 Since the federal circuits have refused to protect
color alone as a trademark, the dissent found no reason for the majority to
grant a registration that the regional circuits would not recognize in infringe-
ment actions.'
Furthermore, the dissent noted that the majority's failure to follow the
regional circuit courts in denying trademark protection for color would invite
forum shopping by trademark registration applicants desiring to protect the
use of color as trademark.1 6 Aware that the regional circuits do not register
marks consisting of color alone, the dissent suggested that applicants would
appeal registration denials from the TTAB to the Federal Circuit to obtain
favorable judgments.' 7 The dissent then asserted that the division between
the Federal Circuit court and the regional circuits concerning the color
protection issue also would upset the current predictability in trademark
law.'5 8 The dissent noted that predictability in trademark law is important
for attorneys in planning for registration and potential litigation, and in
advising clients.5 9 Additionally, the dissent noted that the current court
interpretation of the Lanham Act adequately protected color as trademark. 60
The dissent explained that color was protectable when used in combination
with a distinctive design.' 6' The dissent further reasoned that current federal
law prohibits the intentional "palming off" of one's goods for those of
another regardless of whether the owner of the goods has a registered
mark. 
62
152. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1129 n.3. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (1982) (establishing concurrent
jurisdiction between United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and regional circuit
courts on matters of trademark registration).
154. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129 n.3; see U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982) (establishing civil
liability of persons who infringe upon another's registered trademark); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1121 (granting jurisdiction of all civil damage suits under chapter to federal courts of appeals
other than the Federal Circuit). Although the regional circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over matters of trademark infringement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit retains jurisdiction to review appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office, including
those appeals from the Trademark Office, including those appeals from the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB). S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 2-3, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE & AD. NEws 11, 12-13. The Federal Circuit in Owens-Corning, therefore, properly
exercised the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction in reviewing the TTAB's decision concerning the
protectibility of OCF pink.
155. See supra note 3 (discussing infringement provision of Lanham Act).
156. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
157. Cf. id. (majority's decision inconsistent with current federal circuit court consensus
inevitably will invite forum shopping).
158. Id.
159. See id. In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the dissent stated that the public had
a valuable interest in the consistency and predictability of the law. Id.
160. See id. at 1129-31 (discussing current protection of colored marks under Lanham
Act).
161. See id. (discussing current protection of distinctive colored designs under Lanham
Act; see also supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing protectible color combina-
tions and designs).
162. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1130-31; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (prohibiting use
19861 1455
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
Moreover, the dissent criticized the majority's consideration of the
potential risks of market monopoly and shade confusion as well as the
majority's finding that OCF had established the secondary meaning of OCF's
pink mark. 63 The dissent argued that color protection in Owens-Corning
might create a barrier to lawful, free competition in the home insulation
industry. 64 The dissent explained that OCF claimed 75% of the insulation
market and dominated the field to such a degree that some buyers would
not purchase insulation unless the insulation was pink. 16S The dissent, there-
fore, concluded that new entrants in the insulation business might be unable
to compete if the color pink was unavailable for use.66 The dissent found
the shade confusion theory persuasive in refusing trademark protection of
the color pink for reasons of practicality in administering the trademark
protection process. 167 The dissent stated that since registration applicants
must include black and white drawings of proposed trademarks, including
proposed colored marks, a reviewing court would have difficulty in deter-
mining the likelihood of confusion among colored marks. 6 Finally, the
dissent found that OCF had failed to carry the difficult burden of proving
that the OCF pink mark had acquired secondary meaning because OCF
failed to state the degree to which OCF advertisements focused on the color
pink and because OCF's consumer survey failed to show that consumers
associated pink insulation with one source. 69
of false designations of origin and false descriptions of goods in commerce); see also Brooks
Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 859 n.Il (11th Cir. 1983). In Brooks Shoe
Manufacturing Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit defined "palming off" as the intentional attempt to induce consumers to believe that
the deceiving person's product is the product of another. Brooks, 716 F.2d at 859 n. 11.
163. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1130-32 (Bissell, J. dissenting).
164. Id. at 1130.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 1131 (discussing shade confusion rationale); see supra notes 143-44 and
accompanying text (same).
168. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131; see 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2) (1982) (registration
applicant must submit drawing of mark to Patent and Trademark Office); see also 37 C.F.R. §
2.52(b) (1985) (registration in black pen on white paper). The dissent in Owens-Corning implied
that a reviewing court would have difficulty in determining the likelihood of confusion among
colored marks because the court would have before it only a black and white drawing of the
proposed mark. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
provides color designations and a color chart, however, to the TTAB and the Federal Circuit to
aid in the resolution of protection issues. 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e). Furthermore, the TTAB already
has decided issues of trademark protection involving color shades. See Wire Rope Corp. v.
Secalt S.A., U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255, 256 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (brilliant yellow band compared to
bronzy-gold band to determine likelihood of confusion). The ability of the TTAB and the courts
to examine the CFR's color designations and color chart in determine whether the protect a
color mark combined with the existence of case precedent resolving the issue of color shade
protection suggests that the dissent's concern has little merit.
169. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131-32; see Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1199
(discussing Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's ciriticism of OCF evidence); supra notes 57-
59 and accompany text (same).
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The majority and the dissent in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
relied on case precedent to reach different results on whether color alone is
protectable as trademark.' 70 The majority correctly stated that following the
passage of the Lanham Act, courts could and did protect color marks.' 71
Admittedly, the majority failed to note that courts generally have limited
color protection to marks consisting of color in combination with words,
designs, or other distinguishing matter. 7 2 Indeed, courts have protected color
marks applied to the entire surfaces of products in very few instances.
73
Despite the nearly unanimous view against single color protection, the
legislative intent behind the Lanham Act and federal policy considerations
support the Federal Circuit's decision to protect color alone as trademark. 7
The report by the 1946 Senate Committee on Patents stated that Congress
intended to liberalize and, thus, encourage trademark registration through
the Lanham Act. 7 1 In the Senate Committee's view, federal statutes should
encourage trademark registration because registration prevents a manufac-
turer from adopting a mark whose use might cause confusion in commerce.'
76
Congress also recognized that trademarks allow the consumer to choose
170. Compare Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118-20 (majority finds color trademarks
protectible after Lanham Act) with id. at 1128-30 (dissent states that before and after Lanham
Act overall color not subject to trademark protection).
171. Id. at 1120; see supra note 90 and accompanying text (after Lanham Act, color marks
subject to trademark registration).
172. Compare Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120 (majority states that contrary to absolute
prohibition, courts decide color protection issue case-by-case) with id. at 1130 (dissent states
that color is protectible only as part of arbitrary design).
173. See Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147 F.2d 407, 415
(6th Cir. 1945) (protecting yellow for taxicabs under secondary meaning doctrine); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 911 (W.D. Ark.
1974) (yellow paper granted protection under secondary meaning doctrine when used in
conjunction with term Yellow Pages); In re AFA Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA' 772, 775 (T.T.A.B.
1977) (configuration of overall gold mistmaking machine with black handle granted registration
under arbitrary distinctiveness of design test); Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Crawford-Austin Mfg. Co.,
12 S.W.2d 1098, 1102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (protecting reddish-brown color for wagon covers
and tents under doctrine of secondary meaning); see also supra notes 71-82 and accompanying
text (discussing Yellow Cab and Clifton).
174. See infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text (liberal legislative intent and public
policy to foster free competition support single color trademark registration).
175. See Hearing on S.2679 Before Joint Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 93
(1925), reprinted in 3 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2 (1985) (Lanham
Act liberalizes registration to encourage trademark registration); 1946 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 1274 (purpose of Lanham Act was to liberalize trademark registration); 128 CONG.
REG. S.12634 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1982) (statement of Sen. Hatch) [hereinafter cited as CONG.
REC.]. The Congressional Record of September 29, 1982, indicates that before a business adopts
a trademark, the business needs reasonable assurance that the business will be able to use the
mark uniformly throughout the trading area. CONG. REG., supra, at S.12634. The Record
further notes that Congress included the registration provision of the Lanham Act to assure
businesses that federal courts uniformly would enforce commercial trademark rights. Id. In
light of Congress' intent to encourage trademark registration, courts should construe liberally
the Lanham Act to provide registration to as many marks as possible. Id.
176. CONG. REc., supra note 175, at S.12633.
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effectively between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish
between similar goods. 77 Moreover, trademarks encourage the development
and maintenance of quality by protecting the supplier's earned good will
from misappropriation by competitors. 78 According to the 1946 Senate
Report, trademarks do not create monopolies like patents and copyrights.
79
A trademark only gives the trademark owner the right to prohibit the use of
the mark to the extent necessary to protect the owner's good reputation.1s
Finally, the 1946 Senate Report concluded that trademarks are the essence
of competition.' 8' The Senate Committee, therefore, implicitly would find
the protection of color as trademark consistent with the federal policy of
free competition.
8 2
If courts were to protect color marks, the question remains concerning
which standard among the several available standards courts should use to
determine the registrability of color marks. 83 As a general rule, courts have
construed narrowly the functionality doctrine as one standard available to
determine whether certain marks are barred from trademark protection.
8 4
Under a narrow construction of the functionality doctrine courts refuse to
protect functional product features because the protection of marks that
affect the purpose, performance, or efficiency of products might create
barriers to free competition.8 5 In Owens-Corning, the Federal Circuit stated
that the registration of OCF pink would not hinder competition because the
mark served no essential or aesthetic function in relation to home insula-
tion.'"' Earlier decisions generally support the Federal Circuit's conclusion
that the color pink was not a functional feature of home insulation. 8 7 In




181. Id.; see CONG. REC., supra note 175, at S.12633. The Congressional Record of
September 29, 1982, indicates that competition between businesses could not exist without
trademarks. CONG. REC., supra note 175, at S.12633. The Record explains that competition is
socially and economically desirable. Id. According to the Record, when market competition
exists, the consumer is free to deal with the seller's competitors. Id. Similarly, market competition
protects the seller from buyer coercion because the seller may sell to other buyers. Id. Given
the desirability of competition and the trademark's relationship to competition, Congress should
promote and protect trademarks. Cf. id. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
14 (1962) (discussing federal policy of free competition).
182. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text (since all trademarks promote free
competition, color trademarks promote free competition).
183. See infra notes 185-245 and accompanying text (discussing proper tests for determining
registrability of color marks).
184. See supra notes 45-50, 105-07, and accompanying text (discussing cases considering
trademark protection under functionality doctrine); infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text
(same). See generally J. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, §§ 7:26-7:28 (same).
185. See supra note 9 (discussing functionality doctrine).
186. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
187. See infra notes 189-99 and accompanying text (distinguishing Owens-Corning from
cases finding color marks functional).
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William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,"' the United States Supreme
Court found that chocolate as an ingredient in a quinine preparation was a
functional element because the chocolate functioned to make the quinine
taste good." 9 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit denied protection to color used on match heads and tips because the
coloring distinguished the striking tip from the head of the match. 9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later suggested that
the color pink for a stomach remedy might be functional and, thus, unpro-
tectable because of the pink color's psychosomatic effect on consumers.' 9'
By contrast, OCF's use of the color pink on OCF's home insulation does
not affect the purpose, performance, or efficiency of the insulation prod-
uct. 92 Consumers choose home insulation according to product thickness,
price, size, and availability, not color. 93 The Owens-Corning court therefore
properly held that a narrow interpretation of the functionality doctrine would
not preclude the registration of OCF's pink mark.
94
Although the traditional, narrow view of the functionality doctrine
generally focuses on product features that are essential or helpful to product
performance, some courts also consider functional those marks that are
primarily ornamental on the ground that the marks improve the appearance
of the goods and, thus, increase the likelihood that consumers will purchase
the attractive goods. 9 5 At least one federal circuit court, however, has
criticized the broad interpretation of the functionality doctrine denying
protection of performance and aesthetic product features for having a
numbing effect on the competitive imagination necessary to create aestheti-
188. 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
189. Id. at 531.
190. Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw March Co., 142 F. 727, 729-30 (6th Cir. 1906).
191. Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
192. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text (color serves no nontrademark function
in relation to home insulation).
193. See Brief for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks at 11-12, In re Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (insulation color is not important to
consumer because once installed, insulation is out of sight). But cf. supra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text (discussing Deere & Co., in which court found color functional because
tractor owners matched colored farm machinery).
194. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text (under narrow view of functionality
doctrine OCF pink serves no performance function in relation to insulation). See also infra
notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing broad interpretation of functionality doctrine).
195. See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952) (floral
pattern on china found functional because design was essential selling feature); J.C. Penney
Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941) (rounded bib pocket for overalls
held functional because mark contributed substantially to marketability of product); Famolare,
Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D. Hawaii 1979) (wavy bottom sole design for
shoes held functional because design substantially contributed to shoes, commercial success),
aff'd, mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally supra note 49 (discussing aesthetic
functionality doctrine).
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cally pleasing product features. 96 Furthermore, Congress enacted the Lanham
Act, in part, to encourage judicial protection of the creativity of market
competitors in the development of trademarks. 97 Consequently, although
OCF's pink mark arguably enhances the commercial appeal of home insu-
lation, the Federal Circuit properly held that the functionality doctrine did
not bar the pink mark's registration. 9
In addition to the limited functionality doctrine, courts apply the orna-
mentation doctrine in determining the registrability of color marks.'99 Federal
circuit court decisions generally support the Owens-Corning majority's ap-
plication of the ornamentation doctrine in finding that an ornamental mark
may constitute a valid trademark if the mark's primary purpose is to identify
and to distinguish the owner's goods.200 Federal circuit courts, however,
disagree concerning whether both the arbitrary distinctiveness of design test
and the secondary meaning test are appropriate tests to determine whether
ornamental marks perform the necessary trademark functions of identifica-
tion and distinction."0 ' The registration provision of the Lanham Act suggests
196. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). In Keene
Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
the broad construction of the functionality doctrine that barred the protection of aesthetic
product features contributing to the commercial success of products. Id. The Third Circuit
reasoned that such a broad interpretation of functionality created a disincentive for the
development of imaginative, attractive designs. Id. The Keene court further noted that the
broad view of functionality was not necessary to protect the federal policy of free competition.
Id. The Third Circuit explained that the narrower view of functionality, which focused on
whether the design related to the use of the product, sufficiently promoted free competition.
Id. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 372-78 (criticizing broad construction of functionality
doctrine for denying business' right to encourage consumer demand for products through
aesthetically pleasing product features).
197. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text (discussing federal policy interests of
consumer choice and manufacturer good will).
198. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text (under proper, narrow view of
functionality doctrine, OCF pink servies no performance function in relation to OCF insulation).
199. See supra notes 52-56, 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing ornamentation
doctrine).
200. See supra note 54 (listing cases holding ornamental marks registrable if marks identify
and distinguish owner's goods). But see supra note 53 (listing cases holding solely ornamental
marks unprotectable). See generally J. McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:6 (discussing protectibility
of ornamental marks).
201. See, e.g., Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824, 827 (C.C.P.A. 1975)
(half yellow and half orange fishing floats found unregistrable under arbitrary distinctiveness
and secondary meaning tests); In re Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526, 527-28 (C.C.P.A. 1960)
(protecting red square window labels under secondary meaning doctrine); Yellow Cab Transit
Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147 F.2d 407, 409-15 (6th Cir. 1945) (applying
secondary meaning test to protect yellow for taxicabs): Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F.
Supp. 1184, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (applying secondary meaning test to protect combination of
14 various colors on novel shims); supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing Yellow
Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co.); supra note 122 (discussing In re Hehr
Mfg. Co.) But see, e.g., Midwest Plastics Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., 285 F.2d 747, 750
(10th Cir. 1960) (secondary meaning analysis inappropriate to determine protectibility of red
used in combination with shape of product); Vitarroz Corp. v. River Brand rice Mills, Inc.,
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that both the arbitrary distinctiveness test and the secondary meaning test
are applicable when considering the registrability of color marks. 20 2 Section
1052(a)-(e) of the Lanham Act permits the registration of any mark, other
than the listed exceptions, that distinguishes the applicant's goods from the
goods of others. 203 A color mark does not fall within the exceptions unless
the color is confusingly similar to a currently registered mark. 204 In addition,
section 1052(0 allows the registration of any mark not falling within certain
exceptions that has acquired secondary meaning in relation to the applicant's
goods.205 Consequently, the secondary meaning test applies to color marks
unless the color mark is confusingly similar to a currently registered trade-
mark.2 6 In light of the absence of overriding policy considerations, the mixed
case precedent, and the legislative intent underlying the Lanham Act to grant
trademark protection liberally, courts should permit color registration claims
under the arbitrary distinctiveness provision of the Lanham Act as well as
under the secondary meaning provision.2 7 The Owens-Corning court's ap-
plication of both the arbitrary distinctiveness test and the secondary meaning
test in deciding whether to grant registration of OCF's pink mark, therefore,
was appropriate.
2 8
The Federal circuit properly analyzed the facts in Owens-Corning under
the arbitrary distinctiveness of design test.2°9 In the rare cases involving the
protection of a single color applied to the entire surface of goods, state and
federal circuit courts never have granted protection under the arbitrary
distinctiveness doctrine. 2 0 Moreover, one commentator has suggested that
266 F. Supp. 981, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (possible secondary meaning of yellow as background
color for rice packages found irrelevant because color alone is not subject to appropriation); In
re Shaw, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 253, 255 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (denying protection of green suede
book covers under arbitrary distinctiveness test without regard to possible secondary meaning);
supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing In re Shaw).
202. See infra notes 203-06 (discussing tests suggested by Lanham Act determining registr-
ability of color).
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(e) (1982) (providing for registration of inherently distinctive
marks, with noted exceptions); see also supra note 2 (discussing exceptions of § 1052 of Lanham
Act).
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1982) (mark confusingly similar to registered mark barred
from registration).
205. See id. § 1052(0 (providing for registration of marks with secondary meaning not
excepted by § 1052(a)-(d) of Lanham Act); see supra note 2 (discussing § 1052 exceptions).
206. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1982) (mark confusingly similar to registered mark barred
from registration under inherent and acquired distinctiveness tests).
207. See supra notes 174-87, 201-08 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent,
mixed case precedent concerning proper test for resolving color protection issue, and express
Lanham Act provisions); see also infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (discussing invalidity
of color depletion and shade confusion theories).
208. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1120, 1123-28 (applying arbitrary distinctiveness and
secondary meaning tests); see also supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text (discussing Federal
Circuit's application of arbitrary distinctiveness and secondary meaning tests in Owens-Corning).
209. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text (case precedent does not support
protection of single color applied to product surface under arbitrary distinctiveness test).
210. See supra note 173 (discussing rare cases in which courts have protected single color
marks).
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the required degree of arbitrariness in a design lies between the mere division
of a label into two background colors211 and the application of three colors
diagonally, in a barber pole design. 21 Since OCF applied OCF pink alone
uniformly to the surface of OCF home insulation, the pink mark did not
fall within the required degree of arbitrariness to warrant protectability under
the arbitrary distinctiveness of design test. 213 The Owens-Corning court,
therefore, correctly resorted to the secondary meaning test to determine
whether OCF pink constituted a valid trademark.
2 4
The Federal Circuit properly applied the secondary meaning doctrine in
Owens-Corning.25 Section 1052(f) of the Lanham Act provides that five
years of substantially exclusive and continuous use of a mark in commerce
by the applicant constitutes a rebuttable presumption of secondary mean-
ing. 2 6 Admittedly, despite the minimal five year legislative presumption,
some courts have placed heavier evidentiary burdens on applicants alleging
secondary meaning. 217 For example, in Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports,21s
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals disregarded the
presumption of secondary meaning created by Plastilite Corp.'s exclusive
seven year use of yellow and orange for fishing floats. 219 On the other hand,
some courts have found that in rare cases the exclusive and continuous use
211. J. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:17; see Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175
F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir.) (mere division of label into red and white found not arbitrary or
distinct), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949).
212. J. McCARTHY supra note 10, § 7:17; see Barbasol Co. v. Jacobs, 160 F.2d 336, 338-
39 (7th Cir. 1947) (protecting red, white, and blue barber pole design for shaving cream box
under doctrine of arbitrary, distinctive design).
213. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (design must be more arbitrary than
the two background colors to be arbitrarily distinctive in design); see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text (defining arbitrary, distinctive design).
214. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124-28 (analyzing Owens-Corning facts under
secondary meaning test).
215. See infra notes 216-33 and accompanying text (in light of Lanham Act, legislative
history of Lanham Act, and case precedent, OCF established pink mark's secondary meaning
in Owens-Corning).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982); see J. McCARTHY, supra note 10 § 15:20 (discussing
Lanham Act's arbitrary five-year presumption of secondary meaning).
217. See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 797 (5th
Cir. 1983) (commercial use of "Chick-Kri" for food product for fifteen years insufficient to
establish secondary meaning); Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824 (C.C.P.A.
1975) (commercial use of colored fishing floats for eight years held insufficient proof of
secondary meaning); Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th
Cir.) (continuous use of "Alo" for skin products for seventeen years failed to prove secondary
meaning), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); In re Synergistics Research Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 165, 167 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (five years use alone held insufficient to prove secondary
meaning). But see Wesley-Jessen Div. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 867 (7th Cir.
1983) (continuous use of "U3" designation for six years and "U4" designation for four years
for contact lenses held indicative of secondary meaning).
218. 508 F.2d 824 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
219. See id. at 824, 827 (denying protection under secondary meaning doctrine despite
seven year use because plaintiff did not direct advertisements toward consumer).
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of a mark for less than five years may be sufficient to establish secondary
meaning.220 For example, in Barton v. Rex-Oil Co, 221 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the term "Dyanshine" had
acquired secondary meaning within only three years due to extensive sales,
advertising, and unusual circumstances. 222 In Owens-Corning, by comparison,
OCF exclusively and continuously used OCF's pink mark for 29 years.
223
Given that several courts have granted trademark protection of marks used
only for three years or less224 and that the Lanham Act provides a presump-
tion of secondary meaning after only five years of continuous use, OCF's
use of the mark for 29 years fell within the permissible range necessary to
establish secondary meaning.
225
Though the Lanham Act focuses on the exclusive and continuous use of
a mark in commerce as evidence of secondary meaning, courts also have
relied on consumer surveys to prove that the use and advertisement of a
mark has created an association between the mark and a particular product
source. 2 6 One commentator has suggested that the appropriate survey to
220. See, e.g., Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 544
(2d Cir. 1956) (secondary meaning of "Maternally Yours" established in eleven months through
extensive advertising); Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F.2d f02, 405 (3d Cir. 1924) (three years use
of "Dyanshine" for shoe polish, and extensive sales and advertising held sufficient to prove
secondary meaning); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. First Am. Fund of Funds, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 517,
524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (extensive sales and promotion of "Fund of Funds" over three years
found to establish secondary meaning). See generally J. GILsON, supra note 2, § 2.09[l][4]
(discussing length of use as evidence of secondary meaning).
221. 2 F.2d 402 (3d cir. 1924).
222. See id. at 404-05. In Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., Barton's sales of Dyanshine shoe polish
increased from 1,198,600 bottles in 1919 to 3,485,000 bottles in 1922. Id. at 405. The great
increase in sales in only three years was the result of Barton's proximity to Camp McArthur
where the Dyanshine name quickly became popular among the camp's troops. Id. at 404. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that in light of the unusual
circumstances, Barton's Dyanshine mark had acquired secondary meaning. Id. at 405.
223. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125 (OCF has right to benefits of 29 years of pink
use).
224. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (discussing cases finding secondary
meaning established by continuous use for three years or less).
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1982) (providing five year presumption of secondary
meaning). See also J. GnsoN, supra note 2, § 2.09[l](4) (generally, longer manufacturer uses
mark, greater chance secondary meaning will attach to mark); supra notes 217-22 and accom-
panying text (discussing range in years of use found indicative of secondary meaning in federal
courts).
226. See Zatarains, Inc., v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir.
1983) (question in secondary meaning analysis is not extent but effectiveness of advertising);
Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan, 423 F.2d 843, 850 (5th Cir. 1970) (same); J. GILsoN,
supra note 2, § 2.09[l](2) (Valid consumer survey may be best direct evidence of secondary
meaning); Palladino, Techniques for Ascertaining If There Is Secondary Meaning, 73 TRADE-
MARK REP. 391, 395 (1983) (survey designed to test for secondary meaning should measure
level of association between claimed trademark and plaintiff's product); supra note 129 (citing
cases focusing on surveys as evidence of secondary meaning); see also supra note 26 (defining
secondary meaning as association between mark and product source). But see American Scientific
Chem., Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1982) (lack of consumer
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determine secondary meaning asks two questions. 227 The first question is
whether the interviewee associates the claimed trademark with one or more
than one company.228 If the interviewee associates the mark with only one
company, the next question asks the interviewee to identify the one com-
pany. 229 According to one commentator, surveys should not include persons,
such as retailers, who are not members of the ultimate purchasing public.
2 0
In addition, a valid survey must not ask interviewees leading questions that
suggest only the desired response.2 1' In Owens-Corning, the survey appropri-
ately involved the ultimate purchasers of home insulation. 23 2 As stated by
the dissent, however, the OCF single survey question encouraged interviewees
to respond with only one company name, thus inhibiting multiple re-
sponses. 233 The OCF survey, therefore, had questionable probative value.
23 4
Nevertheless, the registration provision of the Lanham Act, as well as
Congress' goal of liberalizing and promoting trademark registration, support
survey evidence does not defeat protection under secondary meaning analysis when trademark
owner shows continuous use in small market, advertisement of mark, and actual consumer
confusion).
227. See Article, supra note 226, at 397-99 (noting sample survey questions to determine
secondary meaning).
228. Id. at 397.
229. Id.
230. J. GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.09[l](2); see Sorensen, Survey Research Execution in
Trademark Litigation: Does Practice Make Perfect?, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 349, 354 (1983)
(survey population should include persons whose attitudes are in dispute) [hereinafter cited as
Sorensen]; see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (secondary meaning is consumer
association between mark and source of goods). See generally, Reiner, The Universe and
Sample: How Good is Good Enough?, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 366, 366-75 (1983) (concluding
that survey population in trademark litigation must consist of potential buyers) [hereinafter
cited as Reine].
231. See Sorensen, supra note 230, at 356-59. One commentator has suggested that a biased
survey does not measure what the survey proports to measure. Id. at 356-57. The commentator
lists ways in which the surveyor may introduce bias into survey research. Id. at 357-58. The
surveyor may ask questions that presume that interviewees know or should know the answers.
Id. at 358. Additionally, the surveyor may produce bias survey results by asking leading
questions to signal desired responses. Id. For example, to determine the likelihood of confusion
among similar marks, the surveyor might ask the question, "Do you confuse this mark with
another?" Id. at 357. Such a leading question produces bias by coaxing the interviewee to give
the desired rather than the true response. Id. at 358.
232. See Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1199 (survey population included only male
homeowners because female homeowners showed little intent to purchase insulation).
233. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131; see id. at 1127 (survey asked: ... what manu-
facturer makes pink insulation?").
234. See Palladino, supra note 226, at 402; see also note 226 and accompanying text
(results of survey ascertaining secondary meaning must show association between mark and
single source). One commentator has suggested that the survey results in Owens-Corning would
have fallen in the permissable range of buyer association between trademark and product origin
had the surveyor asked the appropriate questions. See Palladino, supra note 226 at 402. The
commentator stated that courts generally find secondary meaning when more than 5001o of those
interviewed associate the trademark in question with the product source. Id. The commentator
noted, however, that courts have accepted as little as 42% buyer association and denied as
much as 61% buyer association in determining secondary meaning. Id.
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the protection of OCF's long established and continuous use of OCF's pink
mark. 235 The Federal Circuit majority in Owens-Corning, therefore, correctly
applied the secondary meaning test to grant registration of pink for OCF
fibrous glass insulation.
236
The Federal Circuit's registration of OCF pink does not undermine the
federal policy interests of competition and effective trademark protection
embodied in the color depletion and shade confusion theories. 237 Under the
infringement and false description provisions of the Lanham Act, courts
may protect an owner's use of a mark only to the extent necessary to avoid
consumer confusion. 238 The color depletion theory, which attempts to prevent
the inappropriate trademark protection that produces market monopoly,23 is
valid only if courts protect an owner's use of a mark consisting of a primary
color. '° If courts instead recognize the limitless variations of color hue, satura-
tion, and brightness, the possibility of color depletion through color trademark
appropriation is remote.2 4 ' The shade confusion theory, likewise, fails to override
the benefits of color protection.2 2 As noted by the TTAB and by the Federal
Circuit in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., shade confusion questions are
no more difficult to resolve than the routinely presented questions in trademark
litigation of similarity in sound, appearance, and meaning. 2 3 In fact, courts
235. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text (legislative history of Lanham Act
reflects congressional intent to liberalize and to encourage trademark protection); see also supra
note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Lanham Act's five year presumption of secondary
meaning).
236. Cf. supra notes 174-82, 216-25 and accompanying text (legislative intent, Lanham
Act's secondary meaning provisions, and case precedent supported Federal Circuit's finding of
secondary meaning in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.).
237. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text (discussing limited validity of color
depletion theory and invalidity of shade confusion theory).
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982) (providing remedy for infringement); id. § 1125 (estab-
lishing liability for use of false origin designations or false descriptions in connection with goods
in commerce); see also supra note 3 (discussing protection of trademark from competitor's use
of deceptively similar mark).
239. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing color depletion theory).
240. Cooper, supra note 67, at 23; see id. at 26. One commentator has stated that only six
primary colors exist. Id. at 26. According to the commentator, the primary colors are red,
yellow, green, blue, violet, orange, and indigo. Id.
241. See id. at 24. According to one commentator, slight variations in a color's hue,
saturation, or brightness greatly increases the pool of colors available for a manufacturer's use.
Id. The commentator defines a hue as a basic color sensation, and brightness as the amount of
white in a color tint. Id. at 23 n.81. The commentator also explained that saturation is the
strength of a hue compared to neutral gray. Id.
242. See infra notes 243-44 (attacking validity of shade confusion theory); see supra notes
142-47 (discussing shade confusion theory).
243. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123 (deciding likelihood of confusion among color
shades no more subtle than when word mark involved); Owens-Corning, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 1198
(same); Cooper, supra note 67, at 24 (same); see also, e.g., G.S. Searle & Co. v. Charles Pfizer
& Co., 265 F.2d 385, 387-89 (7th Cir.) ("dramamine" and "bonamine" found acoustically
similar), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 262 (2d cir.
1957) ("syracol" and "cheracol" held not acoustically similar); Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire
Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740 (C.C.P.A. 1953) ("tornado" and "cyclone" found similar in meaning).
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already have addressed the likelihood of color confusion in the market
without apparent difficulty. 2" The Federal Circuit, therefore, correctly found
that the federal policies to promote free competition and effective trademark
protection do not require the rejection of color alone as a trademark.
245
The Federal Circuit's protection of a single overall color mark will have
a significant effect on the use of color trademarks to identify goods and to
distinguish the goods from the goods of market competitors. 246 The Federal
Circuit's case-by-case approach to secondary meaning, however, creates no
clear standard for proving secondary meaning.247 Consequently, manufactur-
ers planning to adopt a new single color trademark will remain uncertain
concerning how to ensure trademark protection after Owens-Corning.
24
1
Despite the Federal Circuit's failure to establish a clear standard by which
to measure the protectability of color marks, the Federal Circuit implicitly
has alerted manufacturers to the necessity of maintaining comprehensive
records to show the manufacturer's use of the mark, expenditures on
advertising, and the success of advertising in the form of consumer surveys.
249
Manufacturers, uncertain how to create protectable color trademarks
after Owens-Corning, also may look to the general guidelines that have
developed in case law prior to the Owens-Corning decision concerning the
protection of color marks.25 0 For example, color that affects the purpose,
performance, or efficiency of a product cannot constitute a valid trademark
for the product. 25 ' Furthermore, color is unprotectable if the color's primary
function is only to decorate or to embellish the good's external appearance.
25 2
As a general rule, courts protect color only when the manufacturer uses the
color as an element of a distinctive design or in combination with words,
symbols, or other distinguishing matter.253 In addition, since color marks
244. Article, supra note 67, at 24; see supra note 146 (listing cases involving shade
confusion).
245. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122-24 (rejecting color depletion and shade confusion
theories); see also supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text (discussing Owens-Corning court's
rejection of color depletion and shade confusion theories).
246. See infra notes 247-60 and accompanying text (Federal Circuit's registration of OCF
pink mark encourages the risktaker to adopt single color trademark); see also Lehrer, Pink is
Taken; But a Few Hues Are Still Left, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1986, at 33, col. 3 (holding in In
re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. will encourage consistent use of color in package design).
247. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1125 (kind and amount of evidence needed to prove
secondary meaning depends on particular circumstances).
248. Cf. id. (Owens-Corning court holds that kind and amount of evidence needed to
prove secondary meaning depends on particular circumstances).
249. See id. at 1124-28 (discussing OCF's substantial evidence of secondary meaning); see
also supra notes 20-26, 124-37 and accompanying text (same).
250. See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text (stating general guidelines concerning
protectibility of color as trademark).
251. See supra notes 44-51, 105-12, 185-99 and accompanying text (discussing functionality
doctrine).
252. See supra notes 52-54, 113-17, 200 and accompanying text (discussing ornamentation
doctrine).
253. See supra notes 10, 34-43, 118-23, 209-13 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine
of arbitrary distinctiveness of design).
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may not convey trademark meaning immediately to the consumer, the
manufacturer always should prepare to establish the mark's secondary mean-
ing. 25 4 Proof of secondary meaning requires at least three years of substan-
tially exclusive and continuous use in commerce. 2"1 In assessing secondary
meaning, courts also rely heavily on consumer directed advertising expendi-
tures in the range of 112 thousand dollars to three million dollars, preferably
focused on the mark itself rather than the product. 2- Furthermore, consumer
surveys are highly probative of secondary meaning when the survey results
show that more than fifty percent of those interviewed associate the color
mark with a single source. 257 In light of the near unanimity in judicial
opposition to single color protection and very strict requirements in proving
the protectability of all color marks, a manufacturer's adoption of a single
color mark is a risky strategy. 2 8 The manufacturer must weigh the costly
risk against the substantial benefits of colorful goods, namely, consumer
attraction and a potential increase in sales.21 9The Federal Circuit decision in
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., therefore, opens the door for the
willing risktaker to colorful competition.2w
JANET R. HUBBARD
254. See supra notes 10-18, 124-37, 215-36 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of
secondary meaning).
255. See supra notes 125-28, 216-25 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive and
continuous use of trademark as evidence of secondary meaning).
256. Cf. supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (discussing general advertising expend-
itures as evidence of secondary meaning).
257. See supra notes 135-36, 226-34 and accompanying text (discussing use of consumer
surveys to establish secondary meaning). See generally Palladino, supra note 226, at 401-02
(discussing level of association necessary to establish secondary meaning).
258. See supra notes 250-57 and accompanying text (discussing federal circuit prevailing
new and general requirements concerning color protection).
259. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (color is effective marketing tool); see also
supra note 6 (discussing trademark advertising function).
260. See supra note 10 (Federal Circuit only circuit court currently protecting overall
product color as trademark); supra note 8 and accompanying text (color is effective marketing
tool); supra notes 250-57 and accompanying text (discussing strict requirements for ensuring
trademark protection of color).
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